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A universal case cannot be made for national carbon taxes.
Nevertheless,  such  taxes  make  eminent  sense  for  many  develop-
ing  countries  - on the grounds  of equity,  efficiency,  ease  of tax
administration,  and  an improved  local  environment,  even  ignor-
ing the potential  benefits from controlling  global  carbon  emis-
sions.
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Shah and Larsen  evaluate  the case for carbon  * A carbon  tax can significantly  reduce local
taxes  in terms  of national  interests.  They reach  pollution  and carbon  dioxide emissions.  Cost-
the following  conclusions:  benefit analysis  shows  countncs with few or no
energy  taxes substantially  gaining from carbon
A global  carbon  tax involves  issues  of  taxes in tenrs of an improved  local environment.
intemational  resource  transfers  and would  be
difficult  to administer  and enforce.  It is thus  * A  carbon  tax of $10 a ton produces  very  small
unlikely to be implemented  in the near future.  output  losses  for  Pakistani  industries  analyzed  in
this paper,  and  the output  losses  are fully  offset  by
* National  carbon  taxes  can raise significant  health  benefits  from  reduced  emissions  of local
revenues  cost-effectively  in developing  countries  pollutants  - even  ignoring  the  global  implications
and are not likely to be as regressive  in their  of a reduced  greenhouse  effect.
impact  as commonly  perceived.  Such taxes  can
also enhance  economic  efficiency  if introduced  * Tradable  permits  are preferable  to carbon
as a revenue-neutral  partial  replacement  for  taxes where  the critical  threshold  of the stock of
corporate  income  taxes or in cases where subsi-  carbon  emission  beyond which temperatures
dies are prevalent.  The welfare  costs of carbon  would  rise exponentially  is known.  Given our
taxes  generally  vary directly  with the existing  current  ignorance  on the costs of reducing
level of energy  taxes, so a carbon  tax should  be  carbon  emissions  and the threshold  effect, a
an instrument  of choice for countries  such as  carbon  tix aopears  to be a better and more
India and Indonesia,  which have few or no  flexible  instrwment  for avoiding  large unex-
energy  taxes.  pected oosts.
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of  energy, and demand for food.  Under current practices, the result could be appalling
environmental conditions in both urban and rural areas.  The World Development Report
presents an alternative, albeit more difficult, path - one that, if taken, would allow future
generations to witness improved environmental conditions accompanied by rapid economic
development  and the virtual eradication  of widespread  poverty.  Choosing  this path will require
that both industrial and developing  countries seize the current moment  of opportunity  to reform
policies, institutions, and aid programs.  A two-fold strategy is required.
* First, take advantage  of the positive  links between  economic  efficiency, income  growth,
and protection of the environment. This calls for accelerating  programs for reducing poverty,
removing  distortions  that encourage  the economically  inefficient  and environmentally  damaging
use of natural  resources, clarifying  property  rights, expanding  programs for education  (especially
for girls), family  planning  services, sanitation  and clean water, and agricultural  extension, credit
and research.
* Second, break the negative links between economic activity and the environmen:.
Certain targeted measures, described in  the Report, can bring dramatic improvements in
environmental  quality  at modest  cost in investment  and economic  efficiency. To implement  them
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References1.0 Introduction
The last few years have witnessed  a dramatic  growth in worldwide  concern over global
climate change  and a proliferation  of proposals  to limit  or reverse global  environmental  damage.
Carbon taxes and tradeable permits figure prominently  in proposed  economic  policy responses.
Despite  this policy interest, empirical  work relevant  to developing  countries  is almost  completely
lacldng.  Even for developed  countries, research on carbon taxes is of recent origin (see e.g.
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 1990, Poterba 1991, Pearce 1991  and Goulder 1991) and still largely
in progress.  A careful analysis of carbon taxes in terms of their impacts on efficiency, equity,
economic  growth, government  revenues  and environmental  protection, is needed for an informed
debate on policy  development  (see Summers 1991). This paper takes  a first step in this direction
by  quantifying the efficiency and equity implications of  carbon taxes for  a  few selected
developing countries.
The paper is organized into seven sections.  The remainder of Section 1 outlines the
global warming issue and suggested  policy responses.  Section 2 briefly outlines the potentials
and perils of global carbon  tax regimes. Section  3 deals with the economics  of a national  carbon
tax.  Calculations on  the revenue potential and differential incidence of  carbon taxes are
1,-esented for India, Indonesia, Pakistan, USA and Japan.  For Pakistan, detailed calculations
on the distributional  implications  are also presented. Section  4 provides estimates  of the impact
of carbon taxes on greenhouse gases and local pollutants for the sample countries.  Impacts of
carbon taxes on industrial performance  for selected industries  in Pakistan are traced,  in Section
5, using dynamic  production  structure  empirical models. Section  6 evaluates  the use of tradeable
permits  as an alternative  to carbon taxes. A final section  presents  a summary  of the conclusions.
The paper concludes that whereas a global carbon tax may be a more distant policy option,
national carbon taxes -- if introduced  in revenue-neutral  fashion by reducing  corporate income
taxes -- offer significant  potential in combatting  global change and local pollutio-  as well as
reforming the tax system.  Further, a conservative  evaluation  of the benefits of reducing local
externalities  overwhelms  the negative  output effects  of carbon  taxes. Thus, even ignoring  global
externalities, a case for carbon taxes for some countries can be made purely on own national
interest considerations.
The Problem and the Status of Current Policy Discussions
In recent years, worldwide concern about the atmospheric accumulation  of so-called
"greenhouse" trace gases - carbon dioxide (CO,), methane (CH 4),  nitrous oxides  (N 2 0),
tropospheric ozone (03), and chlorofluorocarbons  (CFCs) - has been mounting.  By trapping
some of the sun's heat in the atmosphere, these gases permit the existence of life on earth.
Their  rapid accumulation, however, can  contribute to  a  rise  in  the  earth's  temperature
(commonly  termed the "greenhouse  effect" or "global  warming"). C02 is estimated  to contribute
80.3% of total warming potential (Nordhaus 1991).  Scientists  fear that if the current pace of
accumulation continues unchecked into the 21st century, a point might be reached when the
absorptive capacity  of the earth's atmosphere  would become  exhausted  and a natural disaster  of
unprecedented  proportions would consequently  ensue.  Even without this point being reached,
significant  warming  of the earth's surface  is expected  to have major economic  consequences  (see
1Churchill  and Saunders, 199  1, for an overview  of the scientific  and economic  issues of relevance
to developing  countries). Developing  countries  with agrarian  economies  and/or coastlines  would
be particularly vulnerable to natural calamities associated with global warming.  It must be
emphasized that there is considerable  uncertainty  at the present time regarding global climate
change, its magnitude, its regional manifestations  and its consequences.  Much scientific  work
remains to be done.  The uncertain  state of our present knowledge  of global warming coupled
with the potent-ally large and irreversible damages that might result, call for public policy
responses that are both flexible  and reversible. The possible use of carbon taxes and tradeable
permits to deal with global climate change has initiated  a controversial  debate.
These debates reflect a wide spectrum  of views on this issue. Some argue that in view
of the uncertainties  regarding climate  change, inaction  would be the best policy (Eckaus, 1991).
At the other extreme, some environmentalists  argue that we may have already missed  the boat
and immediate  economic  policy responses that may forsake growth are needed (see Postel and
Flavin, 1991). A majority, however, take a middle  view. Energy economists  argue that energy
policy options  consistent  with restraining  the greenhouse  effect also make good economic  sense.
Churchill and Saunders  (1991), for example, exhort developing  countries to seize the initiative
and  'increase  incentives for sustainable energy use,  shift to  cleaner alternative fuels and
technologies, and improve efficiency in energy production, distribution and end use" (p.28).
Some public finance economists espouse the same middle-of-the-road  view by presenting a
somewhat  different  perspective that emphasizes  reliance on flexible  and less distortionary  tools
to deal with an uncertain but potentially serious problem.  Summers (1991) has argued that
corrective taxes, e.g. taxes on carbon contents of fossil fuels can raise significant  amounts of
revenue at a relatively small deadweight loss while furthering global and local environmental
protection and  discouraging "bads",  and  therefore represent "what we  pay  to  preserve
civilization". It has also been argued that in developing  countries, carbon taxes offer a potential
for enhancing the environment as well as  financing developmental  expenditures, and could
therefore serve as a means to enrich civilization.
It is interesting to  note the large energy subsidies that prevail in a handful of large
carbon-emitting  countries. Getting  energy prices right would prima facie represent  a first order
priority in any economic  policy response designed  to curtail greenhouse  gas emissions. Larsen
and Shah (1992a)  examine energy pricing practices around the world.  In determining  the level
of subsidy, they use border prices of fossil fuels as reference prices (as proxies for marginal
opportunity  costs of production). Total world energy subsidies  in 1990 are estimated to be in
excess of US $230 billion and, in revenue terms, equivalent  to a negative carbon  tax of US $40
per ton of carbon.  The removal of such subsidies could reduce global carbon emissions by
9.5%, and would  translate into a 21% reduction  in carbon  emissions  in the subsidizing  countries.
To achieve  an equivalent reduction  in tons of emissions  in the OECD  countries, a carbon tax of
US $60 per ton would need to be imposed  in the OECD countries. This would result in a total
annual cost (in terms of foregone output, adjustment costs, etc.) of US $15.5 billion.  This
amount would then represent the  upper bound for OECD compensatory transfers to  the
subsidizing  countries.  It is also worth noting that very large (37-68%) reductions in global
carbon emissions could be achieved, were Japanese or German standards of energy efficiency
to be universally  adopted.
2While this debate continues to rage, some countries have already moved to adopt tax
policies that, intentionally  or otherwise, bear on the issue of global warming. In late 1989  and
in response  to ozone depletion, the USA introduced  a tax on the sale of CFCs at an initial rate
of $3.02 per kg, representing a 200% tax on the sale price.  This tax is scheduled  to rise to
$6.83/kg by 1995 and to $10.80/kg by 1999. Total revenue intake during the first five years
is estimated to total $4.3 bil.on.  The USA has not yet imposed a carbon tax but legislation  is
currently pending in the U.S. Congress for the phased introduction  of a carbon tax to start at
$5 per ton of carbon in 1991, rise to $25 per ton in  1995.  Proposals to increase excises on
gasoline and introducing a Federal BTU tax are also under disussion.  Note that the U.S.
Government remains uncommitted  to a targeted policy response to climate change other than
advocating  economic  poiicies  which make  good economic  sense  independently  (the so-called  "no
regrets" policies). Among  European  countries, Finland took the lead in introducing  the world's
first carbon tax at a  rate of  $6.10 per  ton of carbon on all fossil fuels in  January 1990.
Netherlands  and Sweden ($45/ton tax) have followed suit in February 1990 and January 1991
respectively.  The European Community is currently debating a proposal to  introduce in a
revenue-neutral  manner a community-wide  carbon-cum-energy  tax at US $3 per barrel.  The tax
would increase by $1 a barrel each year in real terms until it reached $10 per barrel (roughly
equivalent to a carbon tax of $70 per ton) in the year 2000.
At the international  level, momentum  has steadily  built behind  the proposition  that global
warming  and other aspects of climate change  are of major consequence  and require a concerted
global policy response.  In  1990, the UN General Assembly formally launched international
negotiations  on a  "Framework Convention  on Climate Change" and assigned this task to an
"Intergovernmental  Negotiating  Committee"(INC). The INC has held conferences in Geneva
(1990, 1991)  and Washington  (1991).  These conferences  have debated international  protocols
to limit emissions of "greenhouse  gases.  A global climate change "framework  convention" is
likely to be ratified at the June 1992 UN Conference  on the Environment  and Development  to
be held in Brazil.  The discussion in these international  fora has cl  nitered  on both domestic  and
global policy options to combat global climate change.  These have included: immediate  term
options such as a global carbon tax or permits (tradeable or otherwise) and emission limits;
intermediate  term measures  such as increased  energy efficiency,  afforestation,  biomass, nuclear
energy and population  control; and long term measures such as backstop  technologies  that use
solar, solar-hydrogen  and other environmentally  safe sources.  Developing  countries are fully
involved in the debate on these issues.  One argument often advanced is that the greenhouse
effect results from the accumulation  over a long period of trace gases contributed  primarily by
industrial  activity in developed  countries, and consequently  that developing  countries  should not
be asked to sacrifice their current developmental-goals  in order to address a problem created by
past policies of developed countries.  In fact, if one were to construct an index of  "global
warming debt" by level of development,  this particular argument would have some empirical
validity (see Smith, 1991).  It is also frequently asserted that any global attempt to  limit
environmentally  harmful emissions would ultimately  slow the economic  development  of LDCs.
Attempts to develop energy intensive manufacturing  capability in the early to mid stages of
development would be more costly, and hence more difficult.  Also as importers of energy
intensive  manufactures  (primarily  capital  goods), developing  countries  would end up bearing the
burden of  the policy response applied to emission generating activities.  In  general, it is
3commonly  perceived that, unless accompanied  by compensatory  transfers, the relative costs of
action are likely to be higher for developing  countries, given that their relative contribution  to
the accumulation  of these gases is expected  to grow faster than that of the OECD countries  over
the next century.  The available literature offers little guidance in determining the validity of
these arguments.  The following  section provides pre!iminary  and tentative guidance  on these
questions.
2.0  Global Carbon  Taxes: Potentials  and Perils
Taxes on the carbon content of fossil fuels have been advocatAx  in recent years as part
of a proposed concerted international  effort to combat global climate change.  While both the
need for and the mechanics of  such taxes remain unsettled issues, a general consensus is
emerging that, if adopted globally, such taxes would represent a flexible, reversible and lower
cost  alternative to  regulatory responses, including the  widely-discussed notion of  equal
percentage reductions in greenhouse  emissions  by all countries. The latter measure is unlikely
to lead to the equalization  of marginal emission  reduction  costs from all sources and would  not,
thereforv, result in  a  cost efficient outcome for the world as a  whole (see Hoel,  1991).
Tietenberg (1985) reports that cost savings associated with moving from equal percentage
reductions to a market based instrument such as a carbon tax, could be substantial  (exceeding
40% of total costs). Maler (1989)  also reports that a uniform percentage  reduction strategy for
greenhouse gas emissions would  capture only one third of the total potential  gains from optimal
allocation. A uniform level carbon tax (i.e., tax per unit of carbon  emissions  equal for all gases
and all countries), if imposed by a global agreement, would equalize the marginal costs of
emission reductions (by fossil fuel and by location), and would therefore be cost-efficient.
Several alternative designs for such an agreement are possible, with each presenting its own
particular shortcomings.  Consider the case of a domestic carbon tax that is imposed by an
international  agreement. Since perspectives  on global warming vary among countries, national
commitment  to impose such taxes will also vary.  If a country has signed such agreement  under
international pressure, that country can  make the carbon tax an  ineffeclve  instrument by
reducing  existing  energy taxes, by taxing  close substitutes  of fossil fuels (e.g. hydroelectricity),
and providing subsidies  to complements  or products that are fossil fuel energy intensive,  and by
lax enforcement  of the agreed-upon  carbon tax (see Hoel 1991). Thus by following  a suitable
strategy, a free ride becomes  possible. A global  carbon tax imposed  by an international  agency,
on the other hand, would impinge on national sovereignty  and therefore would not likely be
accepted internationally.  A third alternative would have globally imposed but nationally
administered  and collected  carbon taxes; countries  would  make a positive or negative  net transfer
to an intemational agency based upon an agreed revenue disposition  scheme. Basic criteria for
such  redistribution would be  population and  GDP,  or  a  combination of  these  factors.
Additionally, a small fraction of the revenue pool could be distributed on the basis of special
considerations,  e.g. to provide an inducement  to countries  which might view global warming  as
beneficial (such as Russia, Canada and Nepal) to join an international  agreement. Tables 2.1
and 2.2 provide illustrations  of net transfers involved  based on the three revenue redistribution
schemes  outlined  above, using either standard  GDP or GDP adjusted  by purchasing  power  parity
-- so-called  Penn GDP. From these tables, it is apparent that a revenue  redistribution  alternative
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cl.elim'  Orow dafer.tetien  are  rat  Included.based on population  alone would  be unacceptable  to most industrialized  countries, whereas  one
based solely on GDP would not be agreeable to developing countries.  Note that under the
formula  that uses population  as the sole factor, net transfers to developing  countries  would  dwarf
current official development  assistance. It is possible  that a formula that uses a combination  of
both factors and therefore redistributes  only a very small fraction  of total carbon tax revenues,
might find acceptance  by a majority of countries.
A recent proposal by Norway would have mandatory greenhouse reduction targets
imposed on industrial countries; such targets could be exceeded  only by financing the transfer
and/or adoption  of green technology  in developing  countries. If such a proposal  is received well
in OECD countries, some  of these countries  might well choose to adopt carbon taxes to achieve
the agreed-upon  targets, then partly use the proceeds from carbon taxes to finance technology
transfer to developing  countries. In general, the prognosis  for the acceptance  of a global carbon
tax regime is quite pessimistic.  The degree of  scientific uncertainty that surrounds global
warming makes it unlikely that a  majority of  countries would agree  to  an international
convention  that is seen to forsake their current growth.  The critical question then is that if one
ignores the important yet uncertain phenomenon  of global warming, is there a case for the
adoption of national carbon taxes on other grounds, such as  tax reform or a reduction in
environmental  externalities? The following  sub-sections  present  a benefit-cost  calculus  of carbon
taxes based on these latter considerations.
3.  Economics of a National Carbon  Tax
As discussed  earlier, taxes on the carbon content of fossil fuels to combat global climate
change have been widely  advocated  and also recently implemented  in selected  countries. In the
following section, the case for carbon taxes is examined in terms of their revenue potential,
efficiency  and distributional  implications,  and impacts  on global  and local externalities. For the
purpose of these calculations, a small fossil fuel carbon tax of the order of $10/ton of carbon
contents is selected. Such a tax results in 2% and 8.6% increases  in the aggregate  price of fossil
fuels, and  1.0% and 5.6%  reductions in consumption of  fossil fuels, in Japan and India,
respectively (Table 3.1).  Partial  equilibrium calculations presented in  this  paper,  offer
reasonable and  defensible approximation of  the  impact of  small carbon taxes; the  same
confidence  could not be asserted for those taxes of $100/ton or higher which are frequently
discussed  in global mo'dels.
3.1  Revenue Potential of Carbon Taxes
The revenue potential  of carbon  taxes is extremely  large. For example, a $10/ton  carbon
tax, individually  imposed  by all  iaiions  of the world could raise $55 billion in the very first year
of its operation (see Table 3.1).  For some countries, like China and Poland, such revenues
would amount to about 2% of GDP and would be sufficient  to wipe out central government's
budgetary  deficit. On the average, countries  having  a 1987  per capita GDP of less than US$900
could raise revenues exceeding  one percent of GDP and 5.7% of government  revenue. For the
OECD countries, comparable figures would be 0.21% of  GDP and  1.0% of  government
7revenue. Carbon taxes in general are easier to administer  than  personal and corporate taxes and
thereby less prone to tax avoidance and evasion.  Due to tax evasion, the latter taxes raise
revenues that are considerably  less than their potential  yield. Carbon taxes therefore present an
attractive alternative to income taxes in developing  countries.  But how do such taxes fare in
terms of equity and efficiency?
3.2  Distributional  Implications  of Carbon Taxes
The existing literature on industrialized countries typically portrays carbon taxes as
regressive charges.  This is because expenditures  on fossil fuel consumption  as a proportion of.
current annual income, falls with income.  Poterba (1991) relates carbon taxes to annual
consumption expenditures -- a proxy for permanent income -- and still finds a  regressive
incidence,  although  one considerably  less pronounced  than  with respect to annual  income. These
results nevertheless  cannot  be generalized  to developing  countries,  where the incidence  of carbon
taxes would be affected by institutional  factors. Some important  factors  that may have  a bearing
on the tax-shifting  are: market power, price controls, import quotas, rationed  foreign  exchange,
the presence of black markets, tax evasion and urban-rural migration.
Case (a): Full Forward Shifting.  The degree of tax-shifting  depends upon the relative
elasticities of supply and demand for the taxed commodity.  For example, carbon taxes on
production or use of fossil fuels can be fully forward-shifted  in the short run if the firms in the
industry have full market power, or the demand for the taxed commodity  is perfectly inelastic,
or the supply  is perfectly elastic. In Table 3.2, columns  (a) and (b) present carbon  tax ($10/ton)
incidence calculations for Pakistan using data from  the  1984/85 Household Income and
Expenditure  Survey and employing  two alternative  concepts  of household  income. Column (a)
relates carbon tax payments to household  current income by income class and column (b) to
household  expenditure  by income  class. In either  case, the carbon tax burden falls with income,
thereby yielding a  regressive pattern of  incidence.  Such regressivity is nevertheless less
pronounced with respect to household  expenditures, thereby confirming the same conclusions
reached by Poterba (1991) for the US.
8Table 3.1  Revenue Potential of a US $10/ton domestic carbon tax (Using UN National Accounts  GDP)
Carbon  tax
GOP  Carbon  Carbon  revenues Carbon  tax
Popu-  per  emissions  emissions  Tax  Tax  to total  revenues
lation  capita  to  per  Revenues revenues  Gov't rev  gov't  to gov't
(mill)  CUSS)  GOP  capita  (Tax:S1O/ton)  to  to GDP  revenues  deficit
1987  1987  (kg/$)  (kg)  mill  USS  GDP  (X)  X  K  X
BANGLADESH  *  106.1  166  0.179  30  32  0.18X  9.12X  1.96X
NIGERIA  ^  106.6  229  0.366  84  90  0.37K  15.71X  2.33X  4.18X
CHINA  *1068.5  286  1.868  533  5699  1.87r 21.19X  8.81X  262.31X
INDIA  '797.53  322  0.567  182  1454  0.57X  14.73K  3.85X  6.65X
PAKISTAN  *102.48  325  0.394  128  132  0.39X  17.29X  2.28K  4.63X
INDONESIA  *171.44  443  0.346  153  263  0.35X  21.33X  1.62X  21.97K
ZIMBABWE  *  8.99  s9a  0.774  463  42  0.77M  33.10K  2.34X  7.03X
EGYPT.  ARAB  REPUBLIC*  50.14  109  0.536  380  190  0.54X  38.07X  1.41K  9.03K
KOREA,  OEM  PEOPLE'S  R 21.37  889  2.063  1834  392  2.06X
Total  8292
Averages  1.07X  18.78X  5.71K  25.20K
MEXICO  *  81.86  1715  0.550  943  772  0.55K  17.41X  3.16K  4.06K
BRAZIL  ^141.43  2145  0.166  356  503  0.17X  33.29X  0.50K  1.42K
SOUTH  AFRICA  *  33.11  2493  0.919  2292  759  0.92X  23.02X  3.99X  16.11K
VENEZUELA  *  18.27  2629  0.485  1276  233  0.49X  21.61K  2.25K  27.25K
KOREA.  REPUBLIC  OF  42.08  3121  0.342  1067  449  0.34K  17.27X  1.98X  -77.26K
Total  2716
Averages  0.38X  25.16X  1.53K  4.56K
POLAND  37.66  1697  1.967  3338  1257  1.97X  38.78K  5.07X  137.92X
YUGOSLAVIA  *  23.41  2848  0.492  1403  328  0.49X  6.86K  7.18K -1288.78K
USSR  *  283.1  8325  0.430  3578  10129  0.43X
CZECHOSLOVAKIA  *  15.57  9242  0.445  4110  640  0.44X  48.35K  0.92K  527.11K
Gensrmwn  East  *  16.65  11261  0.477  5369  894  0.48K
Total  13248
Averages  0.47X
AUSTRALIA  *  16.25  11364  0.346  3926  638  0.35X  26.50  1.30K  28.73K
CANADA  *  25.85  16056  0.263  4221  1091  0.26X  20.29X  1.30X  -10.32K
Germany,  West  *  61.17  18249  0.159  2898  lm  0.16X  29.34K  0.54K  15.01K
UNITED  STATES  *243.77  18434  0.277  5112  12461  0.28K  20.23X  1.37K  8.45K
JAPAN  *122.09  19437  0.100  1942  2371  0.10X  13.77M  0.73  2.82X
Total  18334
Averages  0.21K  19.77X  1.08X  7.81X
Note: Carbon  emissions  are from fossil  fuel  coabustion  only.
Emissions  from deforestation are not  included.
9Table 3.2  Carbon Tax ($10/Ton)  Inddence - Pakistan 1984/8S
(carbon taxes (TAX) as percent of monthly income (Y) or expenditure (EXP))
Monthly Income  Full Forward  Shiftin  Canital Owners  Caoital Owners (0.69)  Consumotion (0.31)
(Rupees)  TAXIY  TAX/EXP  TAX/Y  TAXIEXP  TAX/Y  TAXIEXP
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)  (f)
-600  1.49  1.19  0.66  0.53  0.92  0.74
601-700  0.89  0.83  0.62  0.58  0.71  0.66
701-800  0.91  0.86  0.64  0.60  0.72  0.68
801-1000  0.80  0.77  0.68  0.66  0.72  0.69
1001-1500  0.81  1.81  0.72  0.72  0.75  0.75
1501-2000  0.81  0.85  0.76  0.79  0.78  0.81
2001-2500  0.82  0.87  0.74  0.79  0.77  0.82
2501-3000  0.74  0.80  0.77  0.83  0.76  0.82
3001-3500  0.76  0.83  0.75  0.81  0.75  0.82
3501-4000  0.78  0.83  0.77  0.83  0.77  0.83
4001-4500  0.68  0.78  0.78  0.90  0.75  0.86
4500+  0.51  0.67  0.80  1.06  0.71  0.94
Regressive  Regressive  Progressive  Progressive  Proportional  Progressive
10Case (b):  Complete  Absence of Forward  Shifting. Under a variety of circumstances,  the
burden of carbon taxes can fall entirely on capital owners.  This can happen if price controls
apply and legal pass-forward  of the tax is disallowed,  or if supply is completely  price inelastic.
The carbon tax will then be fully borne by fixed factors of production.  With binding import
quotas or rationed  foreign  exchange, carbon  taxes will reduce  rents received  by quota recipients,
rather than affect prices paid by consumers. Under the assumption  of zero forward shifting, the
burden of a carbon tax is attributed to capital income alone.  The allocation of tax by capital
income is then related to household  income and household  expenditures. Both these calculations
yield a progressive distribution  of the carbon tax burden (see Table 3.2: columns (c) and (d)).
Case (c): Partial Forward  Shifting.  Clearly, (a) and (b) above are polar cases and are
unlikely to be fully satisfied for energy products in any country.  There are only a handful of
empirical studies which examine  shifting  assumptions  for developing  countries. One such study
was carried out for excise taxes in Pakistan by Jeetun (1978).  He finds 31% forward shifting
of excises in Paldstan. Given than a tax on the carbon content  of fossil fuels at their production
stage is by its very nature an excise tax, it would be reasonable to use this assumption for
assessing the distribution  of the carbon tax burden.  In Table 3.2, columns (e) and (f), 31% of
the carbon tax is attributed  to final consumption  and 69% to generai capital  income; these series
are then related to household incomes and expenditures  by income class.  This results in a
roughly proportional incidence of carbon taxes under the former series and a  progressive
incidence  pattern under the latter series.
Comparison with the Incidence of Personal and Corporate Income Taxes:  The above
analysis suggests that the regressivity  of carbon taxes should be less of a concern in developing
countries  than in developed  countries, This conclusion  is further  reinforced  when one examines
the incidence  of personal income tax in a typical  developing  country. Personal income tax may
not necessarily  turn out to be a progressive element in the overall tax system, given both tax
evasion and urban-rural migration effects, and their significance  in lower to middle income
countries.  With respect to tax evasion, Shah and Whalley (1991) argue that, if the bribe rate
is high and tax compliance low, the redistributive impact of the bribe system is likely to
dominate the direct redistributive effects of income taxes.  The relevant issue then is who
receives  the bribes. If public service is dominated  by a seniority  system,  then high officials  with
higher income and wealth receive a large portion (or the majority) of the bribe, along with
professionals (accountants)  who often act as "middlemen"  in this process.  Increasing income
tax can thus trigger a reverse distributional  process from middle  class businessmen  and others
to wealthy elites, an entirely opposite conclusion to that commonly  reached.  Thus tax evasion
either reduces or offsets the progressivity of the tax system.  The perceived progressivity  of
personal income tax is  further clouded by  the operation of  the Harris-Todaro effect.  In
developing  countries, personal  income tax is imposed  on urban sector incomes  only. Under  such
circumstances, if expected wages are equalized  across modern and traditional sectors through
rural-urban migration  effects, some  of the burden of the (urban) tax is shifted  to the rural sector
through  intersectoral wage effects. Thus, rural workers, although  they face no legal liability  to
pay the tax, bear part of the burden of the tax through  reduced wages. The potential  importance
of this effect is illustrated  by Shah and Whalley (1991) using 1984-85  data for Pakistan. They
11find  that  incorporation of  the  Harris-Todaro effect  in  incidence calculations clouds the
progressivity  of the personal income tax in Pakistan (see Table 3.3).  Shah and Whalley (1991)
also present calculations  establishing  the progressivity  of corporate income taxes that take into
account complications  introduced by foreign and public ownership of the corporate sector in
Pakistan.
The above analysis suggests  that concerns over the regressivity  of carbon taxes may  be
over-stated. If the lowest income  group is protected  from the regressive impact  of carbon taxes
by direct subsidies  or alternate measures, then the regressivity  of carbon taxes may not pose a
serious policy concern.  Further, if carbon taxes are used to reduce personal income taxes,
traditional concerns that such a tax change would represent a move to a less progressive tax
structure are not fully  justified.  Thus, a commonly  perceived  and widely  accepted  case against
carbon taxes, based on equity grounds, does not hold up under a closer scrutiny.
3.3  Efficiency Costs of Carbon Taxes
By design, carbon taxes distort production, investment  and consumption  decisions  and
thereby internalize  the social costs of global and local externalities. For every dollar of carbon
tax revenues raised, consumers lose more than a dollar in direct and indirect costs.  It is the
indirect  or hidden costs of carbon taxes relative to other forms of taxation  that are of interest to
policy makers.  The literature commonly refers to these costs as marginal welfare costs of
taxation.  In evaluating the potential  of carbon taxes, one needs to determine what will be the
impact on economic efficiency if the same revenues were to be raised by carbon taxes rather
than by existing (and distortionary)  taxes on income. The empirical literature on this question
is regrettably sparse.  Poterba (1991), for example, provides estimates  of average and marginal
deadweight  loss associated  with carbon  taxes relative to a no-tax scenario. Such calculations  are
interesting, yet, as the following  analysis demonstrates,  pre-existing  taxes have a major bearing
on welfare costs. Further, it is the differential  (relative to other taxes), rather than the absolute
incidence  of carbon taxes, that offers useful policy insights. Goulder (in progress) is pursuing
this line of inquiry for the U.S.  using a computable  general equilibrium model.  Browning
(1987)  has argued that a properly specified  partial equilibrium  model  of taxation's welfare  costs
offers superior insights on the measurement  of welfare costs since, in such an analysis, the
contribution made by key parameters to the final estimate remains transparent, whereas it is
obscured in CGE models.  He further demonstrates  that almost aUl  the differences in welfare
costs of taxation for the US can be traced to different assumptions  regarding key parameters,
rather than differences in the nature of models (i.e. partial vs general equilibrium).  In the
following, two measures for the differential costs of carbon taxation and a measure for the
absolute  burden of carbon taxes are presented. All these measures  explicitly recognize  existing
taxes.  Derivations  of these expressions  are laid out more fully in Appendix A.
Case (a):  Welfare Costs Under  a Revenue Neutral Change That displaces  Equal yield
Personal Income Taxes by a $10/ton Carbon  Tax.  An evaluation  of the welfare  costs  of carbon
taxation  is carried out here by using  a frequently  employed  concept  of applied  welfare economics
known as the Hicksian compensating variations.  According to this measure, welfare loss is
defined  as the additional  income required to maintain  the consumer's original utility level, given
12(a)  lncidence  of Peronal Incoe Taxes in Pakistan under  AlternatIve Approaches (tax a  a percentae of total  Inom)  )
Form of income  tax shift to rural sector
No ptrsonal income tax  Reduced  wages  for low-income nnalhboutbo  d  in rural sector  rural households  Reduced  rural uwges  overall  i income (rupees)  Urban  Rural  Total  Urban  Rural  Total  Urban  Rural  Total Under 7,200  0  0  0  0  0.74  O.S8  0  0.54  0.6t2 7,200-8,400  0  0  0  0  0.83  0.63  0  0.60  0.45 2,400-9600  0  0  0  0  0.88  0.63  0  0.64  0.46 9,600-12,000  0  0  0  0  0.73  0.46  0  0.52  0.34  t 12,000-18,000  0.02  0  0.01  0.01  O.S7  0.3S  0.01  0.41  0.2S 28,000-24,000  0.04  0  0.02  0.02  0.70  0.38  0.02  0.32  0.18 24,000-30,000  0.02  0  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.29  0.13 30,000-36,000  0.20  0  0.13  0.09  0.02  0.06  0.09  0.26  0.16 36,000-42,000  0.22  0  0.16  0.10  0.02  0.07  0.10  0.31  0.17  o. 42.00048,000  0.40  0  0.29  0.18  0.03  0.13  0.18  0.19  0.18 48,000-S4,C"0  0.77  0  O.J0  0.3S  0.01  0.23  0.3S  0.18  0.29  j AboveS4,000  1.33  0  1.04  0.61  0.11  0.47  0.61  0.13  0.48 Nota:  Calculations  ie no  pmonal income taX  m  rural sector  are  based  on actual  tax collecidons  by income  class  as  reponed  in Pakistan,  Governmeat  of  (19835.  All  figures  Irom this survey  are  adjusted  to  bring  the  total  in line  with  data firm Pakistan,  Government  of (1988).  Income  tax  collections  on household incm derived  from  urban  sources  or from  graduated  surcharges  on  land  revenue  are  effectively  erto.
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(b)  InclId  of  Corporate  Taxes  In Pakistan  under  Alternative  Approache (tax as a percentae of  total  Inca)
Tax incidence Income  atgorydsect  to  excluding taxes
Annualhouseold  anthex  burden  paidbystate capitland  Capital  andforeign income  (rpees)  Capital  consumption  and labor  enterprises
Under  7,200  1.18  1.71  I.S6  0.8S 1  7,200-8,400  1.06  1.SS  1.64  0.77 8,400-9,600  1.04  3.S3  1.70  0.76 *  9,600-12,000  1.26  1.62  1.69  0.91 12,000-18,000  1.46  1.70  1.69  1.06
_0%  18,000-24,000  1.70  1.79  1.68  1.24 24,000-30,000  1.68  1.76  1.69  1.22 _  30,000-36,000  1.7S  1.78  1.68  1.28 36,000-42,000  1.77  1.78  1.66  1.29 42,000-48,000  1.81  1.79  1.6S  1.32 48,000-S4,000  1.89  1.76  1.63  1.34 Above  S4,000  2.01  1.74  1.64  1.46the vector of new consumer and producer prices resulting from the policy change.  Thus it is
the additional  income that would make the consumer  indifferent  to the new vector of consumer
prices.  A  Taylor-series approximation of  the  expenditure function, yields the following
expression for the welfare cost of the tax system under the equal yield scenario mentioned
above.
LN=LL/=-1e  E(T1) 2 - (T1+T2) 2
1 p
2  - Tr  +  T 2 X) 
PiW,
2  Pi  W1(1)
1  [  (  (TH)  2  - (T1  + T2H)  2 + zeRwi  1  2  W H. 2  W~~2  J1H
where
'6xP  =  own price elasticity  of fossil fuel demand
;=-  =  cross price elasticity  of fossil fuel demand with respect to after tax wages.
Pc  =  elasticity  of labor supply with respect to prices of fossil fuels.
Cnw  =  elasticity of labor supply with respect to after tax wages.
Pi>l=  composite  price of fossil fuels before carbon tax.
Xi1  =  quantity of annual consumption  of fossil fuels before carbon tax.
W1  =  after tax hourly wages before revenue neutral labor income tax change.
H 1 =  manhours of labor per year.
8  =  share of fossil fuel expenditures  to total expenditures.
'1  =  pre-existing  unit taxes on fossil fuels.
T2  =  unit carbon tax (US$10/ton).
TH
I  =  pre-existing labor income taxes per manhour.
T2 =  reduction in per manhour labor income taxes.
The first term in the expression  above captures the direct effect of higher fossil fuel prices on
fossil fuel consumption. The two middle  terms are the indirect effects (cross effects) of higher
14after tax wages on fossil fuel consumption  and higher fossil fuel prices (lower real wages) on
labor supply.  The fourth term captures the direct effect of higher after tax wages on labor
supply. The key parameters needed for the evaluation  of this expression  are: hours worked  per
year; current labor income tax rate; prices of energy products;  quantity  of energy consumption;
current tax rate on energy; carbon tax rate (per unit of energy); elasticity of labor supply; and
elasticity of  energy demand.  The data required to  calculte  these parameters for India,
Indonesia, Pakistan, USA and Japan were collected from a variety of  sources.  Table 3.4
presents data on carbon emissions, carbon  prices and energy taxes for the sample  countries and
Table 3.5 reports a summary of results on welfare effects based on the above model.  These
calculations suggests  that replacement  of personal income tax by an equal yield $10/ton carbon
tax represents a welfare deteriorating proposition in the sample countries.  Estimates of the
welfare loss (compensating  variations) range from a low of 1.5 cents per dollar of carbon tax
revenues in Indonesia to a high of 17.5 cents per dollar in Pakistan.  On economic  efficiency
considerations  alone, therefo.e, carbon taxes cannot be supported  as a replacement  for personal
income taxes.  The difference  in the welfare costs of a US$10 carbon tax arise primarily from
variations in elasticity values (quite similar for our sample countries), pre-existing fossil fuel
taxes, labor income taxes, carbon prices (i.e.,  market value of total fossil fuel consumption
divided by carbon emissions) and energy price changes from the carbon tax.  The price of
carbon, a key parameter in the welfare cost calculations,  is a function not just of fossil fuel
prices, but also of the types and mix of fossil fuels consumed.  A country that is a large
consumer of coal will have a low price of carbon relative to a country that is a large consumer
of natural gas or oil, even if the latter has the same level of fossil fuel prices.  The relatively
low welfare loss indicated for Indonesia is primarily attributable to lower levels of energy
taxation in Indonesia,  and the relatively  large loss for Pakistan  is due to high pre-existing  energy
taxes.  In the case of Japan, the welfare loss is substantially  lower than for Pakistan  despite high
pre-existing  energy taxes.  This results from the high price of carbon in Japan, which implies
the percentage increase in energy prices due to the US$10  carbon tax will be low.  The welfare
loss for India compares well with that for the U.S., even though  pre-existing taxes in India are
much lower (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5).  This is because the price of carbon in India is only half
of the price in the U.S -- the result of India's high consumption  of coal.
The welfare gain associated with the direct effect of lower labor income tax on labor
supply is very small for India, Indonesia  and Pakistan (at most 0.5% of the total welfare loss),
because labor income taxes are low relative to wage income in these countries.  Higher labor
income taxes make the equivalent  effect substantially  larger in the U.S and Japan (20% and 15%
respectively).  For the first three countries, the indirect effects are small but positive, which
indicates that the positive effect of higher real wages on energy consumption  that results from
the lowering of labor income taxes, dominates  the negative effect of higher energy prices on
labor supply.  Again this is caused by low initial labor income taxes.  In absolute terms, the
indirect effects are negative and larger for the U.S. and Japan.  This is because the negative
effect of  higher energy prices  on  labor supply dominates the positive effects on  energy
consumption  of higher real wages  associated  with income tax reductions,  and because the initial
effective taxation  of labor income is higher in the U.S. and Japan than in developing  countries.
These results imply that analyses which ignore pre-existing taxes will be in error, and could
consequently  result in possibly quite misleading  policy advice.  The difference  in measured
15Table 3.4  Carbon Emissions,  Carbon Prices  and Energy  Taxes  in Selected  Countries, 1987
Country  Carbon Emissions  Carbon Price  Energy Taxes
(Million  tons)  (S/ton)  (S/ton)
India  148.2  117  10.69
Indonesia  26.6  200  0.00
Pakstan  13.2  253  65.13
USA  1246.1  198  26.64
Japan  237.1  538  104.80
Sources:
Carbon emissions  - World  Resources  Institute  (1990)
Carbon price  - Authors' calouations  based on data from Asia Development  Bank and Energy  Information
Administration
Energy taxes  - Authors' caloulations  based on data from International  Energy Agency.
16Table 3.5  Summary  of Welfare Effects of a $10/ton  Carbon Tax, 1987
Carbon Tax  Welfare Loss (-) or  Gain (+)
Revenues
Million  Million  % of Carbon  % of Total  % GDP
US$  USS  Tax Revenues  Revenues
A.  Revenue  Neutral  Change by Equal
Yield Reduction  in Personal
Income Tax
India  1482  -129  -8.7  -0.39  -0.06
Indonesia  266  -4  -1.5  -0.03  -0.005
Pakistan  132  -23  -17.5  -0.39  -0.07
USA  12461  -1049  -8.4  -0.11  -0.02
Japan  2371  -269  -11.4  -0.07  -0.008
B.  Revenue  Neutral Change  by Equal
Yield Reductions  in Corporate
Income Tax
India  1482  +250  +16.9  +0.8  +0.11
Indonesia  266  +23  +8.7  +0.2  +0.03
Pakistan  132  +12  +9.0  +0.2  +0.04
USA  12461  -773  -6.2  -0.08  -0.017
Japan  2371  +213  +9.0  +0.06  +0.007
C.  Raising  Additional  Revenues  with
NO Change  in Existing  Taxes
India  1482  -130  -8.8  -0.40  -0.06
Indonesia  266  -4  -1.5  -0.03  -0.005
Pakistan  132  -23  -17.7  -0.40  -0.07
USA  12461  -1269  -10.2  -0.14  -0.03
Japan  2371  -291  -12.3  -0.08  -0.009
D.  Raising  Additional  Revenues  with
NO Change  in Existing  Taxes
but Accounting  for Subsidies
India  1482  0  0  0  0
Indonesia  266  +1  +0.4  +0.01  +0.005
Palistan  132  -23  -17.7  -0.40  -0.07
USA  12461  -1269  -10.2  -0.14  -0.03
Japan  2371  -291  -12.3  -0.08  -0.009
Source: Calculations  based on the models  presented  in Appendix  A.
17welfare costs can be substgntial  if pre-existing taxes are high, as is the case for Pakistan.  If
these pre-existing taxes were to be ignored, one would obtain for Pakistan fairly low estimates
for the welfare  costs of carbon taxes, similar to those for Indonesia. For India, the welfare  costs
of carbon taxes in a no  tax case scenario, would then be twice the level of Pakistan and
Indonesia  (since, due to the Indian use of inexpensive  coal, carbon prices in India  are nearly half
of those in Pakistan and Indonesia.)
Case B: Revenue Neutr4l Introduction of  a  $10/Ton Carbon tax  by Equal  Yield
Reductions in the Corporate Income Tax.  Feldstein's (1978) model is adapted to derive the
following  expression for the welfare costs of taxation (see Appendix A, Case B for details):
=N  - 1  [  (Tx)  2- (TX+Tx)  2
-- (pi) I  P
TXR_  (X+TX)  ( TJR +r
2  (2  Jp-'T  Tl 2 TR  1
Illar/rT+1)  [  ~1 T1 ( 1 +)  2I)  ]p  fR 1 (2)
P1P~
'TRa  2)  2(  R+TR)
2  (p  R) 2
where
71sr  =  elasticity of corporate  savings  with  respect  to after tax rate of return.
ri  =  after corporate tax rate of return on corporate savings.
T  =  number of years from time of savings to dis-saving.
cl  =  marginal propensity to save.
Ti1  =  pre-existing  unit tax on consumption  in the period of dis-saving;  i.e. unit tax on return
on corporate savings.
R
T2 =  reduction in unit tax on return on corporate savings.
R
Pa  =  after corporate tax discounted  price of consumption  in period of dissaving,  i.e. after tax
price of savings.
Ri  =  savings in real terms such that p1 RR, =  nominal  after tax value of savings.
The first term portrays welfare loss associated  with a $10/ton carbon tax, and is equivalent to
the corresponding  term in Case A.  The second term captures the interaction  of reductions in
corporate income taxes and a simultaneous  increase in carbon taxes.  An increase in the after
tax price of energy products is likely to affect the consumption of energy products, and a
reduction in after tax return on savings is likely to affect savings  decisions.  This term could
18be either positive  or negative. The third term represents  the welfare  gain associated  with a
reduction  in corporate  income taxes.  Corporate  income may be considered  as a return on
savings,  i.e. on a firm's total assets  or shareholders'  equity. Thus  the third term  captures  the
welfare effects of changes in after tax rate of return on savings  in the corporate sector.
Corporate  income  taxes  induce  intertemporal  inefficiencies  by reducing  savings  and increasing
current consumption. Key parameters  needed  for the evaluation  of this expression  include:
energy and retirement  (future)  consumption  expenditures  and prices, taxes on energy and
retirement  consumption,  savings, marginal  propensity  to save out of exogenous  income,
uncompensated  elasticity  of savings  with respect  to after tax rate of return, and price elasticity
of energy  demand.  These  parameter  values  are obtained  from  a variety  of sources. The  model's
results, presented  in Table 3.5, suggest  that, with the major  exception  of the U.S., an equal
yield  introduction  of carbon  taxes  in part replacement  of corporate  income  tax would  uniformly
represent  a welfare-improving  proposition  for the sample  countries. The estimated  net welfare
gain varies  from a high of 0.11% of GDP for India, to a low of 0.007%  of GDP for Japan.
These  positive  net welfare  effects  lend support  to the widely-supported  view that corporate
income  taxes  are far more  distortionary  than labor  income  taxes.
For the U.S., the revenue-neutral  introduction  of a $10/ton carbon tax to replace
corporate  tax revenues  is, in contrast  to the above, a welfare-deteriorating  proposition. The
welfare  loss  is estimated  to equal  6.2% of carbon  tax revenues  or 0.017%  of GDP. The  effect
is due to lower marginal  taxation  of corporate  income  in the USA in compari3on  with other
sample  countries.
Case C.  Raising  Additional  Revenues From Carbon Taxes With  No Change  in &isting
Taxes. The following  expression  for the evaluation  of net welfare  captures  the direct  effect  of
carbon  taxes  on energy  demand  through  price increases,  and also their indirect  effect  throu-gh
reduced  real wages  -- the latter  being  associated  with an increase  in consumption  taxation.'
r g  1  ( T1X)  2_TrX+rX  2
2  (P)  pX 1
(3)
- ew I  P  W  W 1H 1O
The  key  elasticity  parameters  required  for  the evaluation  of the  above  expression  are the demand
elasticities  for fossil  fuels and supply  elasticity  for labor.  The results  presented  in Table  3.5
suggest  that although  the welfare  costs of carbon taxes  are significant,  they represent  only a
small  fraction  of carbon  tax revenues. Estimates  for the sample  countries  range from  a low of
1.5 cents per dollar for Indonesia  (0.005%  of GDP), to a high of 17.7 cents per dollar for
Pakistan  (0.07%  of GDP). The  welfare  losses  for  India,  Indonesia  and Pakistan  are only  slightly
higher  than  those  obtained  in case A.  This  is because,  given  very ineffective  pre-existing  labor
'For a formal  derivation,  see Appendix  A, Case  C.
19income taxes and substantial  tax evasion, the direct welfare effect  of labor income tax reductions
is very small for these countries. The difference  in the two cases is larger for the U.S and Japan
because of higher pre-existing  labor income taxes and levels of tax compliance. Poterba (1991)
finds a much lower welfare loss for the US (average welfare costs of 3 cents per dollar of
carbon tax revenues, or about 0.01 % of GDP) in the revenue increase  scenario by assuming  no
pre-existing  taxes and no wage effects  from carbon taxes.  Thus levels of pre-existing  taxes (on
energy, income etc.) are critical in the estimation  of the overall welfare effects associated  with
tax changes. Calculations  that ignore these effects will understate  the welfare cost of tax policy
changes.
Case D:  Raising  Additional  Revenues  From Carbon Taxes With  No Change  in Existing
Taxes but Accounting  for Subsidies. The efficiency  costs of carbon taxes will be over-stated  if,
as in Cases A through C, subsidies  are ignored.  An efficient energy pricing policy calls for
price to equal long run marginal cost (in the case of no externalities). Thus it is interesting to
re-evaluate  this welfare calculation  by recognizing  existing subsidies (Larsen and Shah 1992).
For the sake of simplicity, only the welfare cost of the carbon tax's direct effect on fossil fuel
consumption  is calculated, and the indirect effect on labor supply of higher fossil fuel prizes is
ignored.  This is justified because the indirect effect on labor supply is less than 1% of total
welfare costs.  In order to calculate the welfare cost, petroleum  products, natural gas and coal
are considered separately  and the same own price elasticity  of demand is applied to all product
groups.  Furthermore, the welfare calculation  ignores the substitution  effect between coal and
petroleum  products in cases A-C, thus overstating  true welfare costs.
Significant fossil fuel subsidies  exist in India and Indonesia. The price of coal in India
was only 85% of long run marginal cost in  1990 (Bates and Moore, 1991), implying a 15%
subsidy.  By (conservatively)  assuming a similar level of subsidy in  1987, the year used here
for welfare  calculations,  a US$10  carbon  tax leads to an approximately  26% increase  in the price
of coal at 1987  prices. Thus a large proportion  of the tax acts to remove the subsidy  and should
be considered a welfare gain.  The welfare cost of the carbon tax on petroleum products and
natural gas is estimated to be equal to the welfare gain of the subsidy removal on coal.  The
overall welfare effect of a US$10 carbon tax is therefore approximately  zero, rather than the -
8.8% of carbon tax revenues in Case C.  Similarly,  petroleum  products in Indonesia  are priced
significantly  below world prices -- approximately 35% lower in  1987.  Following the same
approach as for India, the carbon tax on petroleum products in Indonesia represents  a welfare
gain, although it is too small to eliminate  the subsidies  completely. The welfare gain is larger
than the welfare costs of the carbon tax on coal and natural gas.  Thus, in comparison  with Case
C's welfare loss of -1.5%, the net effect is a small  welfare gain of 0.4% of carbon tax revenues.
This section illustrates not only that are pre-existing taxes critical in estimating the welfare
effects of carbon taxes, but that many subsidies  are also.  Calculations  that ignore subsidies  will
over-state the welfare costs of tax policy changes.
In conclusion, the case for carbon taxes on efficiency  considerations  alone depends on
whether  they are introduced  in a revenue-neutral  manner, whether  they replace  corporate income
taxes, and whether fossil fuel subsidies  exist. According  to the calculations  presented  here, such
taxes do not fare so well against personal income taxes, at least for countries  with pre-existing
energy taxes and no subsidies. Clearly, however, an overall assessment  of carbon taxes must
20therefore consider their impact  on greenhouse  gases and local pollutants,  as well as on industrial
performance  and economic  growth.  These issues are taken up next.
4.0  The Impact of Carbon Taxes on Greenhouse Gases and Local Pollutants
Through their impact on aggregate use and composition of fossil fuel consumption,
carbon taxes may reduce the emissions of local and regional pollutants such as nitrous oxides
(NOx), carbon monoxides  (CO), particulates  (PM) and sulphur  dioxides (SO 2) as well  as carbon
emissions. This section  deals with the impact  of carbon taxes on NOx, SQ and PM emissions.
These extent of these latter three emission types depend on technology,  combustion  processes
and sulphur content of fossil fuels; emission coefficients  therefore vary greatly across sectors
and countries.  Tne data on  emissions are  derived here from available sectoral emission
coefficients  and sectoral fossil fuel consumption  (OECD 1989, and Radian Corporation 1990).
Table 4.1 illustrates the impact of a US$ 10 carbon tax on fossil fuel prices, and on CQ,  SO2,
NOx and PM emissions for selected countries.
The impact of the carbon tax on C02, SO 2, NOx and PM depends on the percentage
increase in the end-user price of each fuel, in addition to the price elasticity of demand and
emission coefficients. It is calculated  as follows:
: =  ;ji elij 8j  =  Eij e'ij Qij eij apij/pu  (4)
where: Z is tons of reductions in CC) 2, SO 2 or NOx; i are sectors;  j are fuels (coal, natural gas
and petroleum products); e',j  is the emission coefficient of  Z for fuel j  in  sector i; Qj  is
consumption  of fuel j in sector i; eu  is the own price elasticity for fuel j in sector i; and bpij/pij
is  the percentage increase in  price  of  fuel j  in  sector i  from the carbon tax.  Interfuel
substitutions  are ignored.
The elasticity of energy demand, being fairly similar across all the sample countries,
does not contribute to the cross country differences  in emission reductions. The price of coal
shows the largest increases  primarily because of the low price of coal per ton.  The
increases for petroleum products and natural gas are only marginal in comparison  because of
their much higher current prices per ton.  India shows the highest  estimated  emission  reductions
principally because coal is the predominant  fossil fuel in consumption;  it experiences  relatively
large reductions  due to the high price increase  induced  by the carbon tax.  Reductions  are lowest
in Japan because of high pre-existing  energy prices that induce very low price increases from
the carbon tax and thus low reductions  in fossil fuel consumption. SQ emission  reductions  are
highest in Pakistan because most such emissions are from high sulphur (5-6%) coal.  SO 2
emission reductions are also quite high in the United States because of the large share of coal
in consumption.  Because of low coal use, Indonesia experiences  relatively modest emission
reductions.  In all  sample countries, percentage PM reductions tend to  follow percentage
reductions in the other pollutants.
A benefit-cost analysis of a  US$10 carbon tax can now be made by comparing the
welfare losses (rable 3.5) of a revenue-increasing  carbon sax (with  no reductions  in either labor
21p
Pakistan  Indonesia  India  United States  Japan
Fossil fuel consumption (milion  local currency)  58209  8793837  222744  246502  15759000
Carbon (C) emissions (million tons)  13.2  26.6  148.2  1246.1  237.1I
Price of carbon (per ton): Local Currency  4409  330595  1503  198  66465
USS  253  200  117  198  538
Energy Taxes (USS/on of carbon)  65.13  0.0  10.69  26.64  104.80  s
Carbon tax (USS/ton)  10  10  10  10  10
Carbon tax (local currency/ton)  174  16500  129  10  1235
Elasticity of enerW demand  -0.64  -0.6  -0.651  -0.6  -0.55
Price increase (from carbon tax) of
coal  37.8%  17.5%  26.2%  18.3%  8 7% 
pArwleum  products  3.2%  5.8%  2.3%  3.4%  0.15%
natural gas  2.6%  4.4%  3.0%  4.3%  1.4%  0
Emissions of (000 tons)
PM  44  87  1192  6478  463
S02  321  337  2207  17900  1600
NOX  203  434  2090  17400  1400
Emission reductions (%)
C  -4.5%  -3.9%  -13.3%  -5.3%  -1.6%  '
PM  -11.6%  -5.0%  -15.3%  -7.8%  -0.6%  0
S02  -19.1%  -4.6%  -15.9%  -10.0%  -2.3%
NOX  -3.8%  -3.8%  -11.9%  -5.6%  -1.2%
(1) Welfare cost of a USS 10 per ton carbon tax  ad
(revenue increasing tax) million USS (Table 3.5)  -23  -4  -130  -1270  -292  o
(2) Cost of carbon (C) reductions (USS/lon)  38.7  3.9  6.6  13.8  78.9  0
(1) divided by tons of C reductions
(3) Price level (GDP1Penn  GDP 1987)  0.23  0.35  0.34  1  1.55
(4) Benefit-cost  ratio*  High (SO2+NOX+PM)  1.8  17.9  9.5  11.2  1.3
Medium (SO2+NOXt  PM)  1.6  12.9  7.5  8.7  1.0
Low (SO2+NOX+PM)  0.5  2.2  1.9  2.1  0.2
*  'High'  is based on Glomsrod et al (1990); 'Medium'  is based on Bernow and Marron (1990); 'Low'  is based on EPA/Energy and Resource  Consultants, Inc.
referenced in Repetto (1990).
Source:  Authors' calculationsTable 4.2  Marginal  Benefits  of NOx, SO 2 and PM Reductions  (US  $/ton)
NOx  S02  PM
Glomsrod  et al.  *  ("High")  10300  1400  3300
Bernow  and Marron  ("Medium")  6500  1500  4000
EPA/Energy  and Resource Consultants  ("Low")  230  637  2550
*  The first study is for Nonvay and the two last for the United  States.
Source: Glomsrod  et al (1990), Bernow  and Mafron (1990),'Repeuto  (1990).
income  taxes or corporate income tax) with the benefits of ernission  reductions. Welfare cost
calculations are for the case which does not account for subsidies.  Thus welfare costs are
substantially  overstated for both India and Indonesia. Benefits are estimated  given only S02,
NOx and PM emission reductions; no attempt is made to estimate the benefits of reductions in
emissions of C02, CO, lead and ground  level ozone. The monetary  value of emission  reductions
for any of these gases will be highly uncertain, in part because the damage emissions cause
depends on: the aggregate level of emissions,  climatic and topographic  conditions,  population
density around emission sources and on concentration levels of  the pollutant.  The main
monetary benefits per reduced ton of S02, NOx and PM emissions, come from improvements
in health and reduced corrosion (see Table 4.2,  for results from three independent studies).
Glomsrod  et al (1990)  and Bernow  and Marron (1990)  report the highest  estimates  based on their
studies for Norway and the United  States, respectively. EPA/Energy  and Resource  Consultants
Inc. report (for the United States)  significantly  lower benefits, in particular for NOx.  This low
benefit estimate for NOx may result from excluding  chronic health effects.  Benefit figures are
adjusted by Penn GDP relative Purchasing  Power Parity indices (Summers  and Heston, 1991)
for each sample country, thereby allowing more meaningful  cross-country  comparisons. Note
that this procedure assumes a  degree of  transferability for different countries' externality
measures that is unlikely to be satisfied in practice; estimates of such measures are therefore
likely to be crude at best.
Notwithstanding  the above caveat, the comparison of costs and benefits (Table 4.1)
suggests that, on local environmental  grounds  alone, Indonesia, India and the United States can
benefit substantially  from a carbon tax.  Benefits  exceed costs by a ratio of more than 7 in two
cases, and approximately  2 in the case of the lowest benefit estimates. In the case of Pakistan
and Japan, because of high pre-existing energy taxes and thus high a welfare cost for carbon
taxes, the benefit-cost  ratio is significantly  lower, although still greater than one.
23It is important to note that, although the monetary benefits of emission reductions are
uncertain, there emission reductions have additional  benefits that are not accounted for here as
already mentioned.  Furthermore, welfare losses are based on the worst-case scenario of a
revenue-increasing  carbon tax not compensated  for by a reduction  in other taxes.  Last, but not
least, significant  energy subsidies in India and Indonesia  are not incorporated  in the welfare
calculations,  which consequently  overstate welfare losses.
Note also that these benefit-cost  ratios do not depend  on the price elasticity of demand
for fossil fuels, which is assumed  identical  for each fuel. Both the welfare  costs of carbon taxes
and the quantity of emission reductions are proportional to that elasticity parameter, which is
therefore canceled out in the ratio of benefits and costs.  The latter depends  primarily on pre-
existing taxes on fossil fuels (which affects welfare costs) and on the valuation of emission
reductions of S02  and NOx in both relative and absolute terms.  Furthermore, the calculations
presented here do not attempt to identify  least-cost  policies for local pollutant reduction. They
merely quantify various additional  benefits from carbon taxes that are frequently  ignored in the
literature.
One means of accounting for the non-uniformity  of emission externality costs across
countries  is to adjust the benefits of emission reductions  for variations  in population  density  and
rural/urban population ratio.  Here,  an equal weight is applied to population density and
urbanization.  In consequence, benefits are larger by an average factor of two for Pakistan,
Indonesia  and India. Thus the benefit-cost  ratio is larger than  one for Pakistan  even when lowest
benefit estimates  are used.  For Japan, benefits  are as much as twelve  times higher.  This is the
result of a very high population density, which brings the ratio to 2.4 in the case of lowest
benefit estimates and to as  much as  14 in  the case of  highest benefit estimates.  In this
circumstance,  Japan would benefit even more from a carbon tax than the United States.
A cost analysis of carbon reductions  is also illustrated  in Table 4.1.  The cost of carbon
reductions  is stated in terms of the welfare costs of a revenue-increasing  US $10/ton carbon  tax,
divided by tons of carbon reductions.  The large cost differences  across countries are caused
mostly  by differences  in pre-existing  energy taxes (high  pre-existing  energy taxes implying  high
welfare costs) and percentage carbon emission reductions. To illustrate this point, the cost of
carbon reductions may be stated as follows:
C =  (W/R )( R/E)  =  (W/R )(t*CJ/E) = W/E  (5)
where: C is the cost per ton of carbon reductions;  W is the total welfare cost of the carbon tax;
R is total carbon tax revenues; E is tons of carbon emission reductions;  t is the carbon tax rate
(US $10/ton); and Ce is the total tons of carbon emissions (thus CJIE is the reciprocal of
percentage carbon emission reductions). Equation (5) reveals that C is high if welfare cost per
tax revenue dollar (W/R) is high (Table 3.5, C), and/or if percentage  carbon emission  reduction
is low (Table 2.2).  The cost per ton of carbon  emission reduction  is lowest for Indonesia,  even
though percentage emission reduction is low.  This is because  of virtually non-existent  energy
taxes, which imply very low welfare costs per tax revenue dollar.  Cost per ton is highest in
Japan because of the combination  of high welfare costs per tax revenue dollar and very low
percentage  emission reductions. The results in Table 4.1 also suggest that optimal carbon  taxes
24are not uniform across countries because of different levels of pre-existing energy taxes and
impact on local pollutants.
The preceding  analyses  of fossil  fuel consumption  and emission  reductions  considers  only
aggregate fuel reductions and not interfuel substitution.  But since a carbon tax may induce
significant  interfuel substitutions, it is to be expected  that the estimated emission reductions in
Table 4.1  are  overstated, given own-price elasticities.  However, allowing for interfuel
substitution  would reduce the welfare costs of the carbon tax, such that the overall ratio of
benefits to costs would most probably be only marginally  affected.
In conclusion, the above analysis suggests that a carbon tax has significant  benefits in
terms of both local pollutant and CO 2 reductions.  A monetary  benefit-cost  analysis indicates
that, for countries with low or non-existent  energy taxes, a carbon tax can be justified on local
environmental  grounds alone, even ignoring its benefits from a public finance viewpoint.
5.0  Carbon Taxes, Industrial  Performance and Economic Growth
Carbon taxes by changing the relative prices of inputs can impact on the production,
financing  and investment  decisions  of firms. In this section, the Bernstein-Shah  dynamic  model
of production structure (forthcoming)  is used to examine the impact of carbon taxes on the
economic  performance  of Pakistan's apparel and leather products  industries (1966-84). Several
features of this dynamic model are noteworthy.
The costs of adjustment  are treated as internal to the firm and are explicitly modelled.
These capital adjustment  costs imply that capital input does not necessarily attain its long-run
desired level within any one contemporaneous  period.  The model formulation allows for
estimation  of this speed of adjustment. Investment  in capital  results in some foregone  output in
the short run.  The model distinguishes  short run, intermediate  run and long run effects of tax
policy initiatives. These effects  are influenced  by the varying  degree  of capital  adjustment. The
model also treats the determination  of output supplies, variable and quasi-fixed  input demands
simultaneously. Thus both the direct and indirect effects of tax policy changes are captured in
the model. Moreover, the dynamic nature of the model  allows for direct and indirect effects to
be estimated  in all three runs of production. In addition  to the explicit modelling  of adjustment
costs, the Bernstein-Shah  model incorporates several features of producer behavior which are
absent from the Jorgenson-Wilcoxen  framework. Output supply is endogenous  and not solely
a function of factor demand or of investment. Furthermore, product markets are not assumed
purely competitive and the nature of firm interdependence,  as measured by the conjectural
elasticity parameter, governs the structure  of product markets.  Finally, the model recognizes
financial  capital market imperfections  as firms are constrained  by the rate of return that can be
earned on their financial capital.  Rates of return on equity and debt capital are  treated as
exogenous  to firm's behavior, and cannot therefore  be influenced  by shareholders. Under such
circumstances, the interest of owners is best served by maximizing  the expected present value
of the flow of funds to shareholders  and bondholders.  In other words, the firm's objective
function is to maximize the expected present value of financial  capital.  The above mentioned
product and financial market imperfections  are germane to most developing  countries.
25Own Price Elasticities  Carbon Tax Elasticities  Imoact of a USStO/ton  Carbon Emissions reductions
Aggregate  Aggregate  Apparel &  Aggregate
TI  Apparel  Leather  manufacturin  Ava%e1_  Leather  Appa  Leather  manufacturin  Leather  manufacturin
;  ~~~~~~~Y  -0.00081  -0.00098  -0.032X  40.039%  40.205%
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Short Run  K  -0.00052  -0.00072  -0.021%  4.028%  0.499%
Y  4.00111  -0.00145  4.044%9  4.057%
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9~ ~  ~  ~~~~~  -0Y  .00220  40.00272  -0.087E  40.10796
Intemiediate Run  M,  1  4.00198  4.00317  4.079%  4.121%
Long Run  M  -2.461  -2.879  - 4.00313  4.00392  -0.124%  4.155%  -10.4% ii'  K  0.00201  4.00255  -0.079%  4.101%
I  Notations:  Y  =  Output
L  =  Man Years worked
M  =  Itermediate Inputs
K  =  Capital stock
Source: Model Resuts
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'U;Table 5.2  Impact of a US $10 Carbon Tax on Manufacturing Value Added and Local
Externalities
PAKISTAN
Paldstan AmmI  La  ther  Industti  PaldstAn  A  tem  M=h%enu6jngi
Short  Intermediat  Long  Short rn
nn  run  run
Output  effect (%)  -0.035%  -0.051%  -0.098%  -0.205%
Output effect
(in 000 USS)  -102  -148  -284  -20900
Value added effect
(in 000 USS)  -19.12  273-3
Emission  Reductions  (%)*
NOX  4.9%  -5.0%  -10.5%  -7.4%
S02  -4.7%  -4.8%  -10.2%  -18.4%
PM  -4.8%  -4.9%  -10.3%  -12.9%
C02  -4.8%  -4.9%  -10.4%  -7.6%
Cost of C02 reductions  - USS/ton
(Ilos of value added divided  44.2  61.9  55.9  14.5
by tons of C02 reductions)
Benefit-Cost  Ratios
associated  with the impact of
a US S10 carbon tax on value
addod and local polluta  na
High  2.5  1.8  1.9  3.9
Medium  1.6  1.1  1.2  3.5
Low  0.09  0.06  0.07  1.1
*Emission  reductions  ae  peretage  of emissions  from the Appami  an  Leather  industrie or fiom total
manufactraing industries.
Includes  sulfiur  dioides  (S02), nitrous  oxides (NOx)  and paticulate matten (PM).  'High" is based on
Glomsrod  et al (1990); 'Mediwnm  is bued on Bernow  and Marron (1990); 'Low" is based on EPA/IEnrgy and
Resource  Consultan,  Inc.  The  ast  study does not include chronic  health effect  of NOx emissions.
Source: Model  based calculations
27Accounting  for them, thus adds a sense of realism to the analysis  of producer responses  in these
countries.
The estimation  model  is characterized  by an after tax rormalized shadow  variable profit
function, output supply and input demand and capital input demand equations.  The model fits
the data quite well.  Furthermore, estimated  parameters satisfy the conditions that the after tax
shadow variable profit function be concave  in capital and net investment  and convex  in prices.
Table 5.1 provides  estimates  of carbon tax elasticities  with respect to input demands  and
output supply in the short, intermediate  and long runs.  These tax elasticities are then used to
calculate carbon tax effects at mean sample values.  A $10/ton carbon tax on the apparel and
leather industries  leads to reductions  in output and input demands  in all periods, with the leather
industry experiencing slightly higher reductions in  output than the apparel industry.  This
difference  is primarily  attributable  to the slightly  higher energy intensity  of the leather  industry.
Long run output impacts  are (-)0.09  % for apparel and (-)O.  11  % for leather  goods, both of which
are higher than intermediate  and short run impacts. Higher adverse  effects in the long run arise
because the model estimation suggests energy inputs serve as complements to both labor and
capital in the two industries.
To examine the same effects for manufacturing  industries  in Pakistan overall, a flexible
accelerator type dynamic factor demand model developed  by Shah and Baffes is implemented
using time series data for the period 1956 to 1985.  This model employs a flexible and non-
restrictive technology and  captures the  short  run divergence of  fixed factors from their
equilibrium  values as well  as the speed  of such adjustment. Parameter  estimates  from the model
suggest some pairwise substitutability  among energy (materials) inputs and capital and labor.
The model results suggest that the imposition of  a  $10 per  ton carbon tax on  Pakistani
manufacturing  industry  will result in an output loss of 0.21  % in the short run (see Table 5. 1).2
The primary reason for larger output losses in aggregate  manufacturing  than in the apparel and
leather industries  is the substantial  impact  of the carbon tax on the price of coal.  Coal is used
primarily in  industries other than apparel and leather.  Thus energy prices for aggregate
manufacturing  increase substantially  more than for the apparel and leather industries.
A comparison of value added losses with the health benefits of reductions in local
externalities throws some (albeit limited) light on the cost-benefit  calculus of carbon taxes.
Table  5.2 reports estimates  of costs associated  with carbon taxes, as well as benefits  arising from
a  reduction in local externalities.  Data limitations restrict the analysis to NOx, SO 2 and
particulate matter (PM) only.  The dollar values on local externalities  are based on the same
three studies used in Section 4.0, adjusted for purchasing power parity.  Benefit to cost ratios
are higher for aggregate manufacturing than for the apparel and leather industries because
relatively large emission reductions from reduced consumption  of high sulfur coal more than
offsets the higher loss of value added.  Ratios are larger than one except in the case with the
lowest benefit estimates for the apparel and leather industries.  These tentative calculations
suggest that losses of value added are offset by health benefits associated  with NOx, SO2  and
PM emission reductions, even if the reduction in global externalities  associated  with curtailing
CO 2 emissions is completely  ignored.  Table 5.2 also reports estimates  for the average cost of
2 Jorgenson-_wlcoxen  (1990)  obtain -0.5%  long run output  effect for the U.S. for a $15.45/ton  carbon tax
28carbon reductions associated with a  US $10/ton carbon tax in terms of US$/ton of carbon
reductions, ignoring the benefits of reductions in local externalities. Calculations  suggest that
such  costs are higher in the apparel and leather  industries. The is primarily  because total carbon
emissions relative to value added in these two industries are much lower than in the overall
manufacturing  sector, while model results suggest that the elasticity of output or value added
with respect to energy prices is only slightly lower.  Thus losses of value added relative to
carbon emission reductions  are higher in the apparel and leather industries.
6.0  Tradeable  Permits
Tradeable  emissions  permits  represent  an alternative  instrument  that can ensure marginal
costs of emission reductions  are equalized  across domestic sources  and across countries. Given
both perfectly competitive  markets and certainty, permits are equivalent  to emissions taxes (see
Hoel 1990). Tradeable permits afford direct control over quantities  of emissions  as opposed to
a carbon tax regime's indirect influence  through prices.  They are also easier to implement  as
an initial allocation of such permits reduces the resistance of existing emitters.  Furthermore,
tradeable permits in terms of their regulatory  effects  are more transparent  to policy makers  and
administrators  (see Oates and Portney, 1991). Tradeable permits have also been cited for their
potential  as a hedging  instrument  against  risk and a vehicle  for international  technology  transfer.
Epstein and Gupta  (1990)  have  argued that  tradeable  permits  could serve  as an instrument
to reduce the risk of investing  in backstop technology  R&D. They argue that agents or nations
that invest in R&D are exposed  to a high probability of failure, although  also to high profits in
the event of success.  If R&D investments  turn out a successful  technology that significantly
reduces the costs of carbon emission reductions,  the price of emissions  permits will fall.  If the
investments  yield no return the price of permits is expected to rise.  This means that risk averse
investors  can purchase futures on emission  permits 3 as a hedging  against  risk.  In this case, total
investments  in R&D can be expected to be higher than if a market for emission permits did not
exist.  One could further argue that carbon taxes would also induce higher levels of investment
if tax revenues were pooled (fully, or in part) in an R&D fund or used to subsidize  R&D.  A
closer analysis  of the effectiveness  of these alternatives  seems appropriate  given potential  gains
from the development  of backstop technology.
Emissions permits will induce international technology transfers if initial emissions
allocations  are such  that industrialized  countries  will purchase  emissions  permits from developing
countries.  If  this is  the case,  developing countries may purchase more energy efficient
technology  from industrialized  countries until the marginal benefit is equal to the permit price.
This transfer could potentially  be quite substantial  and significant  for developing  countries.  Its
magnitude  depends  on the costs of emission  reductions  and initial permit allocations  (Larsen  and
Shah 1992b).  If costs of emission reductions  are high (after some smaller initial reductions)  in
industrialized  countries, then developing  countries  will want to purchase more  emissions  permits
from developing  countries  than if costs are low. This would  imply larger revenue  accumulations
$  According  to the New York  Timnes,  the Chicago Board of Trade will create a private market for trading in sulfur
dioxide emission  permits and forward  contracts,  and a futures  market  is also considered.
29in developing countries which could be used to purchase more energy efficient technology.
Technology  transfers may  turn out to be significant  for developing  countries  because, in addition
to  reducing energy  dependency, new  capital embodies technological progress  and  thus
contributes  to increased  total factor productivity. Total factor productivity  gains are considered
an important component  for economic  growth and improved international  competitiveness.
In practice, tradeable permits are subject to important limitations. These include: the
"thinness" of  permit markets, the presence of  large buyers and  sellers, and  lack of  any
mechanism  to deal with overshooting  the mark.  In the U.S., it is observed that the main reason
the permit markets are not as well-functioning  as envisioned is the "thinness" of the market,
especially on the supply side, that is largely due to trading restrictions  ano unclear definitions
of property rights. When permits are infrequently  traded, clear price signals  are absent, thereby
impairing the functioning  of the permit system. On the other hand, a carbon tax is in itself a
clear measure of the cost of emissions.
To avoid ill-functioning  permit markets, the number of  potential traders should be
sufficiently  large. In the case of carbon emission  permits, an insufficient  number  of traders may
be avoided by integrating international  (inter-country)  and domestic markets. Market power is
then eliminated and sufficient liquidity provided, especially if the market is open to outside
parties  as  well as  "emitters".  In this  case,  any  agent -- a producer  or consumer  -- obtains
emission permits at a price quoted at trading boards, in much  the same way as foreign  exchange
is traded and rates are quoted in international  markets.
There are  alternative market arrangements, although an international (inter-country)
market seems a minimum  requirement  because the costs of emission reduction can be expected
to differ substantially  across  countries. Emission  permits, traded  internationally,  allow marginal
costs of reduction to be equalized  across nations.  Permits may be traded independently  within
nations so that marginal costs are equalized across domestic sources.  It is also possible that
permits will only be traded internationally  and that carbon taxes will be used domestically.
Alternatively, some countries may use emissions permits to reduce domestic emissions while
other countries use taxes.  In the latter case, there may be separate  international  and domestic
permit markets.  Any market arrangement that reduces the number of traders below that in a
globally integrated market is exposed to the danger of market inefficiencies (market power,
iltiquidity).  However, the transactions costs of such markets may be too high to justify the
establishment  of a market that  involves  all "emitters"  of carbon  gases, from large industrial  firms
through to the individual  household  using fossil fuels.  A carbon tax avoids these transactions
costs.  In global trading of permits, large countries  can influence  prices.  For a large seller, it
is optimal to have higher emissions than the level indicated  by the marginal cost of reductions
(the market price for quota); and the opposite holds true for a large buyer (see Hoel, 1990).
A potential problem with permit markets is that the supply of permits is by no means
guaranteed  to be intertemporally  fixed.  New information  about the costs of emission  reductions
and of global warming  will induce  policy makers to change the total supply. Furthermore, such
changes  cannot be preannounced  at the initial time period since the changes  are a function of the
ncw information in future periods.  New information  is therefore similar to random shocks.
This exposes permit holders to the risk of permit price changes that cannot be ignored.  Two
ways of getting around this problem are to establish a futures market, or to let permits expire
at the end of each time period in order to issue the new supply at market determined prices.
30Clearly, additional  transactions  costs will be unavoidable,  thereby making  tradeable  permits less
of an attractive  instrument.
It is not clear whether or not there will be a regional or global policy response to the
greenhouse effect.  In the event of such a response, the most talked about scenario is to set a
target of a certain percentage global emissions reduction below their current (or some future)
level, or to stabilize the current (or some future)  global stock  of emissions. The most frequently
discussed target is a 20% reduction below current levels by a specific year, although a 50%
reduction is considered necessary to stabilize the stock of global emissions at current levels
(World Resources Institute 1990).  What is the optimal policy instrument to achieve this
objective? A carbon tax will result in some uncertainty  about the magnitude  of reductions  but
less uncertainty about the cost of reductions.  Under a regime with tradeable permits the
magnitude  of emissicn reductions will be known, but there may be great uncertainty  about the
total cost of reductions. This is an important  distinction  between the two instruments  in the case
of global warming.  Oates and Portney (1991) make this distinction  when comparing  a carbon
tax with tradeable permits.  If  there is great  uncertainty regarding the costs of  emission
reductions, a tax is preferred in order to avoid potentially  large unexpected costs.  (This is
particularly important if the marginal costs of reduction are rising steeply after some initial
reductions have been achieved.)  However, if the costs of global warming are believed to be
unacceptably high or  there is  a  threshold effect, it becomes very important to  limit total
emissions to an upper bound.  In this case, tradeable  permits are preferred to a tax even though
there will be great uncertainty  regarding the costs of emission reductions. At this point in time,
we do not know whether there is a threshold with respect to the stock of carbon emissions
beyond which temperatures  would rise exponentially.  Furthermore, we know little about the
economic  costs and environmental  consequences  of global warming.  Given present ignorance
regarding the global warming phenomenon,  one might currently  argue for a carbon tax in order
to limit unexpected  costs of emission reductions.  When, or if, future research reveals more
about possible threshold effects and the costs of warming, tradeable permits may become the
appropriate instrument.
A global tradeable permit (or carbon tax) regime poses an additional problem in terms
of  initial permit allocations (or redistribution of  tax revenues).  Larsen and Shah (1992b)
evaluate alternative  allocations,  such as allocations  relative to GDP or population,  and conclude
that neither of the two are likely to induce participation  from significant  groups of countries.
They propose an alternative  allocation, based on willingness  to pay for carbon reductions, that
may induce broader participation  in an international  treaty.
7.0  Sunmarv and Conclusions
This paper has evaluated  the case for carbon taxes on national  interest grounds.  As a
background  to this discussion,  it has also reviewed  current energy  pricing regimes in developing
countries and their implications for greenhouse gas emissions (Larsen and Shah, 1992).  The
following  conclusions  emerge from the analysis:
31*  A global carbon tax raises difficult issues of tax administration,  compliance
and international  resource transfer, and is therefore unlikely to be implemented
in the near future.
*  National carbon taxes can raise significant amounts of revenue in a cost
effective manner and,  in  developing countries, are  not likely  to  have as
regressive an impact as commonly  perceived.  Such 2 iax also fares quite well
in  efficiency terms  if  introduced in  a  revenue-neutral manner as  a  partial
replacement  for corporate income  taxes.  In general, the welfare costs of carbon
taxes vary directly with the existing level of energy taxes and therefore  a carbon
tax should be the instrument of choice for countries with no or low levels of
energy taxation, such as Indonesia  and India.
* A carbon tax also has significant  benefits  in terms of local pollutant  reductions
in addition to CO 2 reductions. The cost-benefit  analysis for selected countries
presented in this paper suggests that countries  with low or non-existent  energy
taxes can receive substantial  net gains from a carbon tax, not just in efficiency
terms, but on grounds of local environmental  considerations  alone.
- A carbon tax of US $10/ton results in very small output losses for the
Pakistani industries  analyzed in this paper.  The estimated  effects  are somewhat
lower than comparable  estimates  for the U.S. obtained by Jorgenson-Wilcoxen
(1990).  The value added losses are,  however, offset by the health benefits
associated  with reductions  in NOx, SO 2 a,nd  particulate  matter (PM) emissions,
even if reductions of global externalities  associated  with the curtailment  of CO%
emissions are ignored.
o  Tradeable permits represent a preferred alternative to carbon taxes should
there be a known critical threshold in the stock of carbon emissions beyond
which temperatures would rise  exponentially.  Given our  current lack of
knowledge about the costs of  carbon emission reductions and the threshold
effect, a carbon tax appears to be a superior and more flexible instrument that
avoids potentially  large and unexpected  costs.
Thus, while a universal case for national carbon taxes cannot be made, even ignoring
global externalities, such taxes make eminent sense for a large number of developing  countries
in terms of efficiency, equity and local environmental  externality  considerations.
32APPENDIX:  Measurement  of Differential  Welfare  Costs of Carbon Taxes
Welfare costs L of a tax system  T,  =  (T 11,TI2,...Tl) introduced  at a non-distorted
equilibrium  with  prices  po = (p1,pO2,...pOn)  is defined  as the difference  in the expenditure  level
E necessary  to maintain  a utility  level  U in the presence  of T and the expenditure  level  required
to sustain  U in the absence  of T, minus  the tax revenues  R:
L (p,PO,)  =  E(p1,U) - E(po,U)  - R (pj, 1poU)  (1)
with P,  = Po + T1.
The expenditure  funcdons  can be approximated  by a second  order  Taylor  expansion  in prices.
Thus in general  the welfare  costs of taxes  introduced  at a non-distorted  initial  equilibrium  is
L =-l  E  E  SIM  Tl T 1 J  (2)
where  S, 4 =  6X 1I/8pli,  the cross-derivative  of the  compensated  demand  function  and Ti  is the  unit
tax of good i.
In the  presence  of existing  taxes,  welfare  costs  of changes  in the  tax system  is not simply
L.  An intermediate  step  becomes  necessary  (Feldstein  1978). Consider  a revenue  neutral  tax
policy  change  such  that P2  = pi + T 2, with  T 2 a vector  of additional  taxes. The total welfare
costs of the tax system  T 1 + T2is
L'(p2,po 0,)  = E(p2,U) - E(po,U)  - R(p 2,pO,U)  (3)
or in general
L  =  -lh  E l: S21 (Tri+T 2 9(T 1 +T 2))  (4)
The additional  welfare  costs  of the revenue  neutral  tax change  is
LN  = L - L  = E(p,U)  -E(p2,0)  (5)
since  R(p2,po,U)  = R(pj,pO,U)  because  of revenue  neutrality.
33Case  A: Welfare  Costs of Carbon Taxes  That Displace  Equal Yield  Personal  Income  taxes.
Consider  the case of two goods  (x, 1-H),  where x is fossil  fuels and 1-H  is leisure  (H
is supply  of labor).  Prices of fossil  fuels and leisure  is  P 0 W 0) in an initial  non-distorted
equilibrium.  The  welfare  cost  of pre-existing  taxes  on fossil  fuels  and labor income  CrT,  T, 1 ),
before  introducing  a carbon  tax, is given  by (2):
L  1  lx  T,x  T,K - 1 OX  ETx TH  18(1  (-  10  Tx  H 2  apTlT  2 awTlr  2  a(pH)TX
L  ~~  2  op;  T1 T1 1
I28w
with T,H =  WI - Wo < 0, T 1x  =  p, - po >  0.  Writing L with compensated  elasticities, (5)
becomes
b~~~E  I  4(T  px  - 2  exW(  p-)  (_Lw-)p1X
,  1 e  (  T1  ) 2p(.X1  e,-l)
2  pi  WI  'I  +  P1 W
_ 2  V(_L1 ) 2WIHl
with the elasticities  evaluated  at (pi, xI) and (wl, H 1).
Suppose  that carbon  taxes  are levied  on fossil  fuels T2
1 = p2 - p, >  O, in addition  to
existing  taxes Tl1, and that labor  income  taxes  are reduced  in a revenue  neutral  manner  T 2K =
W2 - W, >  0.  The welfare  cost  of the tax systen C(1 + T 2Z, T 1" + T2 M) is given  by (4):
34L=  - e  (T2+Ti)a  - 12/X(  Ti+.T?2  (  T 2
2~~ p2 ~  1  2  xv
HT  2  1I  N2
+  '  1 E  +  e'  (+  2)2wH 2 2-2  X  A  W2  )  W
with  the elasticities  now evaluated  at (P 2, X 2) and  (W2,  H2).
The change  in welfare  costs  of the revenue  neutral  tax change  is
t_(TJ)  (T3  4Ta) 2 ]pX
pi 2
ex,  TIT  -TI  (Tlx+ T2X)  (  T1*V Ti.")  1,]p  x1
2-6v  P 1wl
(8)
2  PlElW
1 l  t(TH)2-  (T 1 +  TH)2JWH
where  O  = share  of energy  in total  consumption  and by noting  that
I  (T_+  T  2P) X 2 =  xe(  Tp  2plX+
and similarly  for the other elasticities. The indirect  terms are multiplied  by the expenditure
share  of fossil  fuels, O,  to account  for the fact that  in reality  there are more goods  than  leisure
and fossil  fuels.
The first term in (8) is  'lie  direct  effect  on consumption  of fosil fuels of higher  fossil
fuel  prices. The last term is the direct  effect  on labor supply  of higher  after tax wages. The
35two middle  terms  are the indirect  effects  (cross  effects)  on fossil  fuel  consumption  of higher  after
tax wages  and on labor  supply  of higher  fossil  fuel prices  (lower  real wages).
L N  > 0 would  imply  a welfare  gain from the revenue  neutral  tax change.
We would like to express the two indirect effects in terms of eNw  which can be
accomplished  in two steps. The first  step  is to express  the third  term  in (8)  in terms  of 'x  by
noting  that
Op8w  2(9)
from the symmetry  in the two-by-two  matrix  in the second  order Taylor expansion  of the
expenditure  function. The negative  sign  in (9) comes  from the use  of leisure  as 1 -H.  Given
that
aE  = x  and  aE = H
anv
are the compensated  demand  functions,  it follows  that
ax=  aH
aw  Op
which  is (9), and tierefore
We  i  H  (10)
Thus, the two indirect  tems can  be expressed  as
36- e,|,[  T  - (Tl  +  T2 )  (T1 ' +  T2
11) 1pwl  *o  (1 - e,~i  (11)T  T  +T
The second  step  is to express  the compensated  elasticity  exw  in terms of eII.  Let
U=f(x,l  -H)  (12)
The total  differential  of (12)  (letting  au = 0 is
afax  +  8f  a(1-H)  = 0  (13) Ox  7(  1  -H)
From  the first order conditions  of utility  maximization
8f/Ox  =p  (14)
aflaO(1-H)  w
By (13)  and (14)  and dividing  through  by dW:
ax  aH  =  0 (15)
This gives
pxexh* =  Hejw  (16)
To quantify  LN, T 2H is derived  from  the revenue  neutrality  condition
aR  = T 1 xX 1 - T2RH 1 = o  (17)
for small  changes  in the tax system. From  (17)  we get
T2  - T2 -H  (18)
H 1
37With (11), (16)  and (18)  we have
LM 1  -2.  (Tl  )2 - (TI  +  T2)  2
(XT"  TX  +  T2X)  (Tf  +  T2X-L
(Tl  I  *  (T  H 1 2
ehW[  P,WI  ]VIHM,  (19)
(T1H)  2  - (T2M  +  TX  X1 ) 2
+  I  1HG  W  2  ]  I  A
Note that the elasticity  values applied  to (19) are uncompensated  elasticities  rather than the
theoretically  correct  compensated  elasticities.  The difference  in terms  of welfare  cost  is quite
small  (Willig  1976),  approximately  10%  with  an income  elasticity  of 1 and 0 = 0.05 given  our
uncompensated  elasticity  values. This result may  be derived  from  the Slutsky  decompositions
of the substitution  and income  effect. Thus  welfare  costs  are slightly  overstated  here.
Case B: Welfare Costs of Carbon Taxes That Displace  Equal Yield Corporate Income
Taxes.
Coxporate  income  may  be regarded  as return  on savings  (Feldstein,  1978),  i.e. on assets  or
sharholders equity. Consider  the case of two goods  (x,R) in a two period  model  where x is
fossil  fuel consumption  in the first period  and R is second  penod consumption  of first period
savings,  both in real terms.
Prices of fossil fuels (x) and second  period consumption  (R) are (p.p 0
3) in an initial non-
distorted  equilibrium.  In the presence  of existing  unit taxes  on fossil  fuels and second  perod
consumption  (T 1 ,TIR),  welfare  costs  are given  by (20):
38L  '  1  axTxTx  1  aX  T7XTR - 1O2RTfTR
(20)
1  OR  "R"R
With  T1R  =  pIR  - poR  >  O  T1X =  plx _  poX  >  0.
If ro is the rate of return  on savings  in the corporate  sector, then po  e -r 0" is the
discounted  (current)  price of consumption  in period  T+ 1 in the case of no tax on corporate
income. Similarly,  =  e  1  is the after tax discounted  price, with r, = (1 - t) r. and t is
the corporate  income  tax rate. Thus  corporate  income  taxes  reduces  the real value  of period  one
savings since PI  P  > °
Writing  L with  compensated  elasticities,  (20)  becomes
.9r~  Tx  TmR  x _  ( T1  2plX1  w(p)  R)P 
(21)
TX  R 
2  p-R  i(-p)  (R)p 1 RR  2  p  (  L)2P1 
with the elasticities  evaluated  at (p1,xj) and (piR,RI)
Suppose  that carbon taxes  are levied  on fossil  fuels T2 =  p2 -p 1 > O in addition  to
existing  taxes  T 11, and that  corporate  income  taxes  are reduced  in a revenue  neutral  manner  T2R
=  p 2R plR  <  0.  The welfare  costs of the tax system  (T  + T2x, T1R +  T2R) is
39L/=-  2/(  1Ta  2P2X2  ,/  R(  12)  P  TA+  R 2~  p2 2'  -W  2  P2
(22)
s  Ti'+Ta )  ( T2 " TzR)  pRR2  - 1 e  1  TlR+Tz ) 2pi?RR
tax is
LN  ~  ~  a  . -let(Ti') 2 - (Tlx  T2")  2 j  X
LN  ~  ~~2xR  =  L  -T  +  22  )~  (P1 +) 2 R)
1  T~~~ 1P
(23)
a sl=lR  -(Tlx  +  T2") (T1  +  Ta)  ]p 1
1 RR  0
(T  )  - (pTR +  T22R  2
,  R(  (P  R)  2  2
where  O  =  expenditure  share  of fossil  fuels  in total  consumption  and by noting  that
(  ( Ti_+_Ta") 2p=X_  e  ~(  T  T  + T2 )  2  X1
and  similarly  for  the  other  elasticities.
The first term in (23)  is the direct  effect  of higher  fossil  fuel prices  on consumption  of
fossil  fuels. The last term is the direct  effect  of lower  prices  on second  period  consumption.
The lower taxc  on corporate  savings  reduces  the inter temporal  inefficienlcy.  The two middle
40terms  are the indirect  effects  (cross  effects)  on fossil  fuel  consumption  of lower  prices  on second
period  consumption  and on savings  from higher  prices  on fossil  fuels.
L N >  0 would  imply  a welfare  gain from the revenue  neutral  tax change.
We would like to express the two indirect effects  in terms of  @A which can be
accomplished  in two steps. The first step  is to express  the third term  in (23)  in terms  of 6 Ps
by noting  that
8 2 E  =  2E  (24)
ap 'lap  apap R1
from the symmetry  in the two-by-two  matrix in the second  order Taylor expansion  of the
expenditure  function. Given  that
IE  = X  and  - = i
yp  ap R
are the compensated  demand  functions,  it follows  that
Bx  _  R
A  pR
ap  R  yp
which  is (24), and therefore
AR ,  e  RtX  (25)
Thus, the two indirect  terms  can be expressed  as
41ERj [ TlXl  (TI  T2 )R  +T  T2 )  P1.  (26)
P1pf
The second  step  is to express  the compensated  elasticity  '>  in terms  of 'R60'  Let
U = f (x,R)  (27)
The total differential  of (27)  (lettng 8U=O)  is
afax  +  fR  =  O  (28)
From  the first order conditions  of utility  maximization
-f/Rx  =  p  (29)
By (28)  and (29)  and dividing  through  by OpR:
i,;.  jk  pR  RR  - o  (30)
a,PR  OP  R
This gives
p  Xe  Rw  =_  pit  R 'ERpRi  (31)
By substituting  (26)  and (31)  into (23):
42L  =  _  1  l  (T1X)2 - (TX  +  X)2
R E  (TI  TIR  -(lx  +  T 2 ) (TJ  +  T2:)  p3RR 1 . (32)
pipf
-- 6ie  Rs  ( T12  - (TR +  TR)  2
2  ~~~~(PiR)  2
It remains  to express  EAP  in terms of the elasticity  of savings  with  respect  to the after tax rate
of return  for which  elasticity  alternatives  are available.
Note that
P R  =  "  .R  +  q  (33)
where n is the uncompensated  elasticity  and or  is the marginal  propensity  to save out of
exogenous  income  (Feldstein,  1978). Given  that savings  is S = p'R, we have
R  as  . 'pR  =a  (P RR)  p 
lsp  3pR  S  ap R  S
p  +  aR  (pR)
2 (34)
S  a 8PR  S
By (33)  and (34),
R  =  Sp R  - (1-a)  (35)
Recal that the discounted  price of period  T +  I consumption  isp  =  e  with r the after tax
rate of return  on period 1 savings. Thus,
43as  R  CIS PR  1  =f  p
1$pR  apR  S  ar  S  -Te-zT  ar  S  -.  R  (36)
as  r  1  rT°1 8 1 /rT
because  R  =  - Te7a ar.
It follows that
Rp  =  - (11,,/ZT  +  1  - I  )  (37)
To quantify LN, T2R is derived from the revenue neutrality condition.  With I being total tax
revenues,
I  =T2xXl  + T2  =O  (38)
for small changes in the tax system.  Thus,
$A=  _  Ta.X
TR  A(39)
With (32), (37) and (39), we have
2  (  (x)  2 xx Lg =_  1er  tT  )_(T1  +T2)]pX
T3TR-  ( Tx+T  )(
-(118e/r/T+1-a)  t  RlPR  FlJPIRIO  (40)
(TR) a_  R  x "
44-Case C:  Welfare Costs of a Revenue  Enhancing  Carbon Tax with No Change  In Existing
Taxes
Consider  the case of two goods  (x, 1-H)  as in Case A.  The welfare  cost LN  may be
derived  directly  from  (19)  by noting  that  with  nu other  changes  in thc tax system  than  the carbon
tax on fossil  fuels,
T2H=O  i.  e.  T2XX-  o in  (19))
H1
Thus,
L,N  =  - 1  (,) 2 vp 1 X1
(41)
- eaT[  T1 N  W1H10
as the last term vanishes.
The case of  a revenue increasing  carbon tax may alternatively  be considered  by
recognizing  the indirect  effect  on corporate  savings  instead  of the indirect  effect  on labor  supply.
In this case  L  can be derived  for (40)  instead  of (19). The first  term  will remain  the same  and
the last  term  will  vanish,  but the indirect  effect  will  in this  case  be unambiguously  positive  since
TIR >  0.  This is because  higher  prices  on current  period  consumption  induces  a substitution
to second  period  consumption,  i.e. savings  will  increase. Thus  the welfare  loss  will be slightly
smaller than the direct effect on fossil fuel consumption,  contrary to the case previously
considered  with indirect  effect  on labor  supply.
45Case D: Welfare  Effects of a Revenue  Enhancing  Carbon Tax with No Change  In Exlsitng
taxes but Accounting  for Subsidies
The '  Sulation  will only include  the direct effect on fossil fuel consumption  from a
carbon tax, i.e. the first term in (19) or (40).  Fossil fuels are disaggregated  as petroleum
products/natural  gas (x) and coal (y).  Notation  is the same  as beiore.  Interfuel  substitution
effects  are ignored  in order to be consistent  with  calculations  in Case  A-c.
The expression  for welfare  cost  becomes
TI_  2e  (T)  (1  T2  ) 2 ]px2 2  ~~~(pir)  2
(42)
- 1  E  {'(T, )2 - (TY  +  1)  2
2  ~~~(pY) 
2
Note  ftat the second  term is positive  (welfare  gain)  if T2i <  2 1 Tly  I  . This  is because  T 1?  <
o  is a subsidy.
46REFERENCES
Anderson,  Dennis (1991) "Energy  and The Environment". Special Briefing Paper, The Wealth
of Nations Foundation.
Angell, V. and Srinivasan, S. (1991) "Economic  Issues Related To Greenhouse  Gas Emissions
Abatement  in Asia".  Discussion  Paper (draft), Asia Technical Department, Environment
Division.  World Bank.
Asian Development  Bank (1989): Energy Indicators  of Developing  Member Countries  of ADB.
Ballard, Charles L.  (1990) "Marginal Welfare Cost Calculadons - Differential Analysis vs.
Balanced-Budget  Analysis".  ourmal  of Public Economics, 41:263-276.
Bates, R.  and  Moore, E  (1991) "Commercial Energy Efficiency and The Environment".
Background Paper  No.  5.  World  Development Report  1992.  The  World  Bank.
Washington, D.C.
Bemow, S.  and Marron, D.  (1990) "Valuation of Environmental Externalities for Energy
Planning and Operations, 1990 Update.  Cambridge, Massachusetts:  Tellus Institute.
Bernstein, Jeffrey and Shah, Anwar (1991b) "Taxes, Incentives and Production: The Case of
Pakistan".  Processed.
Birdsall, Nancy and John Dixon (1991).  Some Economics of Global Climate Change: The
Developing  Countries.  Processed.
Browning, Edgar K. (1987).  On the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxation.  The Amcan
Economic  Review, March, pp. 11-23.
Burgess, Joanne C. (1990) "The Contribution  of Efficient Energy Pricing to Reducing Carbon
Dioxide Emissions".  En=g  Polijy,  18(5):449-55.
Chishti, Salim and Fakhre Mahmood (1991).  The Energy Demand in the Industral Sector of
Pakdstan. The PaldgtaDMvMment  Revie,  30:1 (Spring 1991), pp.83-88.
Churchill, A.A. and Saunders, R.J.  (1991) "Global Warming and The Developing World".
Finance and Development,  June.
Diwan, I. and Shafik, N.  (1991) "Towards a North-South Deal on the Environment".  The
World Bank.  Draft.
47Eckaus, Richard S. (1991) "Economic  Issues  in Greenhouse  Warming". Presented  at the World
Bank, WDR Seminar, May 1991.
Energy Information Administration:  International  Energy Annual 1989. DOE/EIA-0219  (89).
Epstein, J.M.  and Gupta, R. (1990) "Controlling  the Greenhouse  Effect - Five Global Regimes
Compared"; The Brookings  Institution,  Brookings  Occasional  Papers. Washington,  D.C.
Feldstein, Martin (1978) "The Welfare Cost of Capital  Income Taxation".  Jourmal  of Political
EQonomy,  86(2):29-51.
Glomsrod, S.,  Vennemo H. and Johnsen, T. (1990) "Stabilization  of Emissions of C02:  A
Computable  General Equilibrium  Assessment". Discussion  Paper No. 48. Central Bureau
of Statistics, Oslo, Norway.
Goulder, Lawrence H.  (1991) "Effects of  Carbon Taxes in  an Economy with Prior  Tax
Distortions: An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis for the U.S.".  Stanford
University and NBER.  Draft.
Green, J.R. and Sheshinski,  E. (1979) "Approximating  The Efficiency Gain of Tax Reforms".
Journal of Public Economics, 11:179-95.
Haugland, T. and Roland, K. (1990) "Energy, Environment  and Development  in China".  The
Fridtjof Nansen Institute.  Report 1990/17.
Hoel, Michael (1990).  C02  and the Greenhouse Effect: A Game Theoretic Exploration.
University of Oslo, Preliminary  Draft.
Hoel, Michael (1991) "Efficient International  Agreements for Reducing Emissions of C02".
The Energy Journal, 12(2):93-107.
International  Energy Agency: Energy Prices and Taxes 4/1990.  OECD Paris 1991.
International  Monetary  Fund (1991): Intemational  Financial  Statistics.
Iqbal, Mahmood  (1986) "Substitution  of Labor, Capital  and Energy in the Manufacturing  Sector
of Pakistan".  Empirical Economics, 11(2):81-95.
Jeetun, A. (1978) "Tax Shiffing in Pakistan: A Case Study of Excise Duty, Sales Tax, and
Import Duty".  Discussion  Paper 30.  Applied Economics  Research  Centre, University  of
Karachi.  Processed.
48Jorgenson,  D.W. and Wilcoxen,  P.J. (1990)  "The Cost of Controlling  U.S. Carbon  Dioxide
Emissions". Presented  at Workshop  on Economic/Energy/Environmental  Modeling  for
Climate  Policy  Analysis,  Washington,  D.C., October  22-23, 1990.
Kosmo,  Mark  (1989)  "Commercial  Energy  Subsidies  in Developing  Countries".  EnergyQoicy,
June:44-53.
Larsen, Bjom aaud  Shah, Anwar (1992a) 'World Energy Subsidies  and Global Carbon
Emissions." Background  paper No. 25.  World  Development  Report 1992. The World
Bank. Washington,  D.C.
larsen, Bjom  and  Shah,  Anwar  (1992b)  "Tradeable  Carbon  Emissions  Permits  and  International
Transfers." Presented  at the 15th  Annual  International  Conference  of the International
Association  for Energy  Economics,  Tours, France,  May t8-20, 1992.
Maler, K.G. (1989)  "The  Acid Rain  Game"  in H. Folmer  and E. van Ierland  (eds):  Valuation
Methods  and Policy  Makdng  in Environmental  Economics.  Elsevier,  Amsterdam.
Manne, A.S. and Richels,  R.G. (1991)  "Global  C02 Emission  Reductions  - the Impacts  of
Rising  Energy  Costs". The Enrgy Journal,  12(1):87-107.
Moore,  Edwin  A. (1991)  "Energy  Efficiency  and  The  Environment'. Report  for  Environmental
Policy  and Research  Division,  Environment  Departnent,  World  Bank.
Morey,  Edward  R. (1984)  "Confuser  Suiplus".  De Ameican  lconomic  Review,  74(1):163-73.
Nordhaus,  William  D. (1991a)  "The  Cost  of Slowing  Climate  Change:  a Survey". The  Eynr
JgMal, 12(1):37-64.
Nordhaus,  William  D. (1991b)  "To Slow  Or Not To Slow:  The Economics  of The Greenhouse
Effect". The Economic  Joumal,  0lI(July):920-37.
Oates,  Wallace  (1991). Pollution  Charges  as a Source  of Public  Revenue. Processed.
Oates, Wallace  and Paul R. Portney  (1990). Policies  For the Regulation  of Global  Carbon
Emissions. Processed.
OECD  (1989):  Energy  and The Environment:  Policy  Overview.
OECD (1991):  Estimation  of greenhouse  gas emissions  and sinks. (Draft).
Pearce, David (1991) "The Role of Carbon  Taxes in Adjusting  to Global  Warming". 3k
Econom  Journal, 10(July):938-48.
49Pindyck, R.S. (1979) "Interfuel  Substitution  and the Industrial  Demand  for Energy:  An
International  Comparison". Review  of Economics  and Statistics, 61:169-79.
Pitt, Mark (1985)  "Estimating  Industry  Energy  Demand  with Firm-Level  Data: The Case of
Indonesia". The Energy Journal, 6(2):25-39.
Postel,  S. and Flavin,  C. (1991)  "Reshaping  the Global  Economy"  in Lester  R. Brown  ed. Sa
of the World, pp. 170-88.
Poterba, James  M. (1991)  "Tax  Policy  to Combat  Global  Warming:  On Designing  a Carbon
Tax."  In R. Dombusch  and J.M. Poterba  (eds.):  Global  Warming:  Economic  Policy
Response. M1T  Press, Cambridge,  Massachusetts.
Pourgerami,  A. and  von  Hirschhausen,  R. (1989)  "Aggregate  Demand  for  Energy  and  Dynamics
of Energy  Demand  Elasticities  in Non-Oil  Developing  Countries".  The  Journal  of Energy
and Dcevopment, 14(2):237-52.
Radian  Corporation  (1990)  "Emission  and  Cost  Estimates  for  Globally  Significant  Anthropogenic
Combustion  Sources  of NOX, N20,  CH4, CO and C02".  Prepared for Office of
Research  and Development,  U.S. Environmental  Protection  Agency.
Repetto,  Robert  (1990)  "Environmental  Productivity  and Why It Is So Important." Challenge,
Sep-Oct  1990.
Shah,  Anwar  and Baffes,  John  (1991)  "Do Tax Policies  Stimulate  Investment  in Physical  and
Research  and Development  Capital?". PRE Working  Paper  No. 689. The World  Bank.
Shah, Anwar and Larsen, Bjorn (1991) "Taxing Choices for Global Environmental  Security".
Research  Proposal,  Public  Economics  Division,  Country  Economics  Department,  World
Bank
Shah, Anwar and Larsen, Bjom (1992) "Global  Warming,  Carbon Taxes and Developing
Countries."  Presented at the  1992 Annual Meetings of  the American Economic
Association,  January  3, 1992,  New  Orleans,  USA.
Shah,  Anwar  and Whalley,  John  (1991)  :Tax  Incidence  Analysis  of Developing  Countries:  An
Alternative  View". The World Bank Economic  Review, 5(3):535-52.
Sterner,  Thomas  (1989)  "Oil  Products  in Latin  America:  The Politics  of Energy  Pricing". 1k
Eo=y  Journal, 10(2):25-45.
Summers,  Lawrence  H. (1991)  "The  Case  For Corrective  Taxation".  The  National  Tax  Jounmal,
September. Vol. XLIV,  No. 3: 289-292.
50Summers,  Robert  and Heston, Alan (1991) "The Penn World Table (Mark  5): An Expanded  Set
of International  Comparisons, 1950-1988". Quartly  Jo.numal  of Economics, 106:327-68.
Tietenberg, T.  (1985) "Emission Trading: An  Exercise in  Reforming Pollution Policy".
Resources for the Future, Washington,  D.C.
The World Bank (1985) "Domestic  Coal Pricing: Suggested  Principles and Present Policies in
Selected Countries".  Energy Departnent Paper No. 23.
The World Bank (1990) "Review of Electricity Tariffs in Developing Countries During the
1980's".  Industry and Energy Department  Working Paper Energy Series Paper No. 32.
The World Resources  Institute (1990): World Resources 1990-91.
Uri, Noel D. (1979) "Energy  Demand  and Interfuel  Substitution  in India".  Er==  EoS
Rve, 12(2):181-90.
Vashist, D.C.  (1984) "Substititdon Possibilities and Price Sensitivity  of Energy Demand in
Indian Manufacturing". The Indian Economic  Journal, 32(2):84-97.
Wiliams, M. and Laumas, P. (1981) "The Relation  Between  Energy and Non-Energy  Inputs in
India's Manufacturing  Industries". The Journal of Industrial Economics, 30(2):113-22.
Willig, Robert D.  (1976) "Consumer's Surplus Without Apology".  The Amercan Economic
mview, 66(4):589-97.
51Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS934  Public  Hospital  Costs  and Quality  Maureen  A Lewis  July 1992  P. Trapani
in the Dominican  Republic  Margaret  B. Sulvetta  31947
Gerard  M. LaForgia
WPS935  The  Precautionary  Demand  for  Boum-Jong  Choe  July 1992  S. Lipscomb
Commodity  Stocks  33718
WPS936  Taxation,  Information  Asymmetries,  Andrew  Lyon  July 1992  C. Jones
and  a Firm's  Financing  Choices  37699
WPS937  How Soft  is the Budget  Constraint  Evan Kraft  July 1992  CECSE
for Yugoslav  Firms?  Milan  Vodopivec  37178
WPS938  Health,  Govemment.  and  the Poor:  Nancy  Birdsall  July 1992  S. Rothschild
The  Case  for the Private  Sector  Estelle  James  37460
WPS939  How Macroeconomic  Policies  Affect  Daniel  Kaufmann  July 1992  D. Kaufmann
Project  Performance  In  the Social  Yan  Wang  37305
Sectors
WPS940  Private  Sector  Approaches  to  Karen  G. Foreit  August 1992  0. Nadora
Effective  Family  Planning  31091
WPS941  Projecting  the Demographic  Impact  Rodoifo  A. Bulatao  August 1992  0. Nadora
of AIDS  Eduard  Bos  31091
WPS942  EfHicient  Environmental  Regulation:  Arik Levinson  August  1992  WDR
Case  Studies  of Urban  Air Pollution  Sudhir  Shetty  31393
(Los Angeles,  Mexico  City, Cubatao,
and Ankara)
WPS943  Burden-sharing  among  Official  and  Asli Demirg0c-Kunt  August 1992  K. Waelti
Private Creditors  Eduardo  Fernindez-Arias  37664
WPS944  How Public  Sector  Pay  and  Gail Stevenson  August 1992  PHREE
Employment  Affect Labor  Markets:  33680
Research  Issues
WPS945  Managing  the Civil Service:  What  Barbara  Nunberg  August 1992  P. Infente
LDCs  Can  Learn  from Developed  37642
Country  Reforms
WPS946  Retraining  Displaced  Workers:  What  Duane  E. Leigh  August  1992  PHREE
Can  Developing  Countries  Learn  from  33680
OECD  Nations?
WPS947  Strategies  for Creating  Transitional  Stephen  L Mangum  August  1992  PHREE
Jobs during  Structural  Adjustment  Garth  L Mangum  33680
Janine  BowenPolicy  Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS948 Factors  Affecting  Private  Financial  Mohua  Mukherjee  July 1992  R. Lynn
Flows  to Eastern  Europe,  1989-91  32169
WPS949 The  Impact  of Formal  Finance  on  the  Hans  Binswanger  August  1992  H.  Binswanger
Rural  Economy  of India  Shahidur  Khandker  31871
WPS950 Service:  The  New  Focus  in  Hans  Jl)rgen  Peters  August  1992  A. Elcock
International  Manufacturing  and  Trade  33743
WPS951 Piecemeal  Trade  Reform  in Partially  Glenn  W.  Harrison  August  1992  D. Ballantyne
Liberalized  Economies:  Thomas  F. Rutherford  38004
An  Evaluation  for  Turkey  David  G.  Tarr
WPS952 Unit  Costs,  Cost-Effectiveness,  and  Susan  Horton  August  1992  0. Nadora
Financing  of Nutrition  Interventions  31091
WPS953 The  'Pedigree' of IEC  Conversion  Michael  Hee  August  1992  E.  Zamora
Factors  for Per  Capita  GNP  Computations  33706
for  the  World  Bank's  Operational
Guidelines  and  Atlas
WPS954 How  OECD  Policies  Affected  Latin  Chris  Alien  August  1992  T. G.  Srinivasan
America  In  the  1980s  David  Currie  31288
T. G.  Srinlvasan
David  Vines
WPS955 OECD  Fiscal  Policies  and  the  George  Alogoskoufis  August  1992  D. Gustafson
Relative  Prices  of Primary  Panos  Varangis  33714
Commodities
WPS956 Regression  Estimates  of  Per  Capita  Sultan  Ahmad  August  1992  E.  O'Reilly-Campbell
GDP  Based  on Purchasing  Power  Parities  33707
WPS957  Carbon  Taxes,  the Greenhouse  Anwar  Shah  August 1992  WDR  Office
Effect,  and  Developing  Countries  Bjorn  Larsen  31393